The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to Family Integrity by Duncan, John C., Jr.
Florida A&M University College of Law
Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law
Journal Publications Faculty Works
2005
The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from
Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to Family
Integrity
John C. Duncan Jr.
Florida A & M University College of Law, john.duncan@famu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.law.famu.edu/faculty-research
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Works at Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ FAMU Law. For more information, please contact
linda.barrette@famu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John C. Duncan, Jr., The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83
Neb. L. Rev. 1240 (2005)
John C. Duncan, Jr.*
The Ultimate Best Interest of the
Child Enures from Parental
Reinforcement: The Journey to
Family Integrity
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ....... .................................. 1241
A . Exordium ......................................... 1246
B. The Definition of a Parent ......................... 1247
C. The Bundle of Common Law Parents' Rights ....... 1248
II. Children's Rights ..................................... 1249
A. The Evolution of the "Best Interest of the Child"
D octrine .......................................... 1250
B. The Role of Guardians Ad Litem and Court
Appointed Special Advocates ....................... 1254
C. Weaknesses of the "Best Interest of the Child"
D octrine .......................................... 1254
III. Those Longstanding Parental Rights and Duties ....... 1255
A. Parental Right to Custody and Care ............... 1255
1. The Ultimate Sanction: The Termination of
Parental Rights ................................ 1257
2. The Future of Foster Care and Its Threat to
Family Integrity ............................... 1260
B. Parental Duty to Provide Discipline ................ 1262
1. Juvenile Justice-The State, the Parent and the
C hild .......................................... 1266
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. B.A. with
Distinction, DePauw University; M.A., M.S., University of Michigan; M.B.P.A.,
Southeastern University; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D, Stanford. Nationally
Clinically Licensed Marriage, Family, and Child Counselor; Texas Certification
in Mediation. Much appreciation goes to Barbara Hale for research assistance.
Other research assistance appreciation goes to Alyssa Campbell, Kristen Hilty,
and Darla Jackson. Acknowledgment for inspiration and ideas is very much due
my mother Yvonne A.J. Duncan, B.S., West Virginia State University; M.S.Cs.,
Boston University and my wife Elizabeth Lunsford Duncan, B.A., Fisk Univer-
sity; J.D., Howard University Law School.
1240
THE JOURNEY TO FAMILY INTEGRITY
C. Parental Right to Children's Services and Control of
Children's W ages .................................. 1268
D. Parental Right to Make Medical Decisions for Minor
Children .......................................... 1271
1. Abortion, Contraception, and Birth Control
Counseling .................................... 1273
2. Treatment/Testing for Sexually Transmitted
D iseases ....................................... 1275
3. Parental Consent for Commitment to Mental
Health Facilities ............................... 1276
4. Caveat: The Irony of the Current Law ......... 1277
E. Divorced Parents: Individual and Parental Rights
Are Subject to Forfeiture .......................... 1278
IV. The Pendulum-Opposite Ends of the Spectrum:
Commentary on Some of the More Extremist
Positions .............................................. 1279
A. Do We Really Need a Bill of Rights for
Children? ........ .................................  1279
B. The Other End of the Spectrum: The "Parental
Rights Movement" ...... .......................... 1282
V. The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from
the Parents' Reinforcement ............................ 1284
A. The Courts and the Right to Family Integrity ...... 1287
B. The Rebuttable Presumption: Parents Are Acting in
the Best Interests of Their Children ............... 1288
VI. Some Suggestions and Discussion of the Parents' Rights
and Responsibilities Act ............................... 1289
VII. Proposed Family Integrity Act ......................... 1290
A. A Proposal for Reform: A Bill to Preserve the Right
of Family Integrity ................................ 1291
VIII. Conclusion ............................................ 1294
Appendix: S.B. 984-
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Bill .......... 1295
I. INTRODUCTION
The status of the American family may well be one of the hottest
political and social issues this nation faces as we emerge into the new
millennium. Most Americans agree that we are in the midst of a dan-
gerous decline in moral and religious values that threatens the very
foundation of our society.' The facts are clear: marriage as a social
institution is threatened and child well-being is affected. 2 Children,
1. See JIM WALLIS, WHO SPEAKS FOR GOD? AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE RELIGIOUS
RIGHT-A NEW POLITICS OF COMPASSION, COMMUNITY, AND CIVILITY 153 (1996).
2. More than thirty percent of births are now occurring outside of marriage, up from
five percent in 1960. The U.S. leads the world in the divorce rate, which has
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particularly teenagers, are lacking basic values such as honesty, self-
discipline, and a good work ethic. 3 In the past thirty years, while the
teenage population has remained fairly static, there has been a six-
hundred-percent increase in teenager arrests for violent crime; teen
suicides have increased more than twenty percent; the number of un-
married teenage mothers has risen three-hundred percent, and the
average SAT score has dropped eighty points. 4 Concomitant with
these facts, parents believe that their authority has been seriously un-
dermined and their ability to discipline their children has been se-
verely diminished.5
It has been suggested that the cause of this decline may be found in
the conflict between our highly valued individual freedoms on the one
hand, and the value we place on commitment, community, and stable
families on the other hand.6 One legal scholar has expressed the mod-
ern changes in family law as having moved from a system that once
stressed "the unitary aspect of the family" and "fixed pattern[s] of role
distribution" to a system that now emphasizes "[t]he separateness and
individuality of the persons who are associated in families and mar-
riages."7 Similarly, another legal scholar has asserted that family
rights "cannot be accurately characterized as the individual rights of
any family member."8
The United States Supreme Court has treated the family as an
"autonomous entity, implicitly recognizing the parental role in pro-
quintupled since 1960. See David Blankenhorn, The State of the Family and the
Family Policy Debate, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 431, 432 (1996). Blankenhorn is
President of the nonpartisan Institute of American Values, which organized the
Council on Families in America. He describes the current cultural trend to be a
movement toward "a post-marriage or post-nuclear family system, where the
married couple, mother-father unit will no longer be held up as a dominant cul-
tural ideal and will no longer reflect the empirical reality for all, or even most,
children." He contends that this trend must be reversed and marriage as a social
institution must be strengthened. Id. at 431, 436.
3. See Megan Rosenfeld, Showdown at the Generation Gap: Survey Finds Today's
Children Lack Values, and Parents Deserve Most of the Blame, WASH. POST, June
26, 1997, at El. This article reports the results of a survey conducted by Public
Agenda, a New York-based nonpartisan public opinion research organization.
4. See DANA MACK, THE ASSAULT ON PARENTHOOD: How OUR CULTURE UNDERMINES
THE FAMILY 14 (1997).
5. See Rosenfeld, supra note 3.
6. See Ellen Goodman, Rebuilding the Family-Report Aims at Improving Quality,
Not Just Length, of Marriage, HARRISBURG PATRIOT EVENING NEWS, Apr. 11,
1995, at A7.
7. See MACK, supra note 4, at 93 n.51, (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF FAMILY LAW 102, 103 (1989)). Glendon, a Harvard Law professor, is
also a member of the Council on Families in America, mentioned supra, note 2.
8. J. Bohl, "Those Privileges Long Recognized: Termination of Parental Rights Law,
the Family Right to Integrity and the Private Culture of the Family, 1 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 348 (1994).
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tecting the child from state action."9 Rather than looking at the
child's rights independently, the Court recognizes that the child's par-
ents may assert the child's rights when those rights are threatened by
state action. The Court analyzes the issue in the context of the fam-
ily's interest as opposed to the State's conflicting interest in the wel-
fare of the child.lO This state-parent conflict is demonstrated in three
landmark U.S. Supreme Court decisions that deal with parents' right
to choose the type of education their children receive. In Meyer v. Ne-
braska,1 1 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,12 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,13 the
Court found that the State's interest in educating children was not
impaired by permitting the parents to choose where their children re-
ceived their education. If the state's interests are in some way under-
mined, then the parents' interests will prevail.
Contrary to U.S. Supreme Court holdings, legislators and state
courts, when creating and applying child welfare laws, have tended to
perceive the family as individuals with separate, and frequently con-
flicting rights, rather than the family as a unit with its own body of
rights.14 Therein lies the problem. While the twentieth century
opened with children having virtually no legally recognized rights, it
has ended with an almost single-minded legal approach focused
strictly on the "best interest of the child." Many of the early changes
were absolutely necessary to protect children from exploitation by
both parents and businesses. This Article asserts that the children's
rights movement has been too expansive-particularly in the past
thirty years-to the detriment of the American family. The unbridled
growth of children's rights has led to the inevitable diminishment of
parental rights. Parents no longer have the autonomy to raise their
children in the manner in which the parents deem appropriate. This
stripping away of parental authority has, in too many cases, caused
parental apathy or confusion resulting in many parents abdicating
their responsibilities to the state, or to the children themselves.i 5
Parents' rights have become inferior to the rights of their children.
The status of parenthood is no longer valued by American society. 16
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id.
11. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
12. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
13. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
14. See Bohl, supra note 8.
15. For example, some parents refuse to establish and enforce any limits whatsoever
for their children, enabling the children to basically do whatever they please; or
parents rely on the State to set the limits, e.g., by establishing teen curfews and
movie ratings.
16. See MACK, supra note 4, at 17. Mack, who interviewed numerous parents while
researching her book, concludes that parents believe "that the larger [American]
culture no longer supports the family as an inviolate unit engaged in a crucial
and worthy task-the task of childrearing." Id.
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This trend must be reversed, the pendulum must swing back toward
parental rights, although not totally, so that parents may be rein-
forced in their role as parents. When parental status is restored, par-
ents will be motivated and inspired to carry out their parental duties
and responsibilities with confidence and commitment. That which is
in the best interest of the parents, generally enures to the best inter-
est of the child. (As a sidenote, my preference is for the less common
spelling "enure," and I will use this form here instead of the more
widely used "inure.").
As courts and legislators have created newly recognized rights of
children, they almost invariably have done so in the best interest of the
child. Yet, the misuse and overuse of this concept as a legal doctrine
has actually resulted in children being further victimized at the hands
of the State.17 As one legal scholar has warned, there are inherent
dangers that exist when "objective" judges and other state officials are
delegated to be the determiners of the best interest of a child.18 Such
a premise suggests that "good parents" can and should view their chil-
dren "dispassionately" and "objectively."19 Passionate, not dispassion-
ate, involvement is required between parent and child.20 Dispassion
is more akin to emotional detachment, and clearly not the way we ex-
pect parents to relate to their children. 2 1 Parents are the best deter-
miners of what is in the best interest of their own children. No one
has a better sense of a child's wants, needs, and personality, than his
or her own parents. Furthermore, no one cares more passionately
about the child and no one has a more vested interest in the child's
welfare than the parents.
By continually recognizing more and more rights of children, which
frequently contravene the rights of parents, state courts and legisla-
tures have diminished the U.S. Supreme Court holdings that parental
rights are fundamental rights.22 The effects of the various state inter-
17. See ROBERT A. BuRT, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 40 (Patri-
cia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 1979). Professor Burt argues that children's
rights advocates fail to consider the manifest inadequacies of the State as protec-
tor of children, by failing to devote the necessary resources to "work intensively
with the parents so that the children's needs to remain with their parents can be
respected." Id.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (as-
serting that "the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours
are ordinarily to be sought , not in the state law but in intrinsic human rights");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("[A] State's interest in universal
education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process
when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the tradi-
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ferences in the best interest of the child has brought about a vocal and
determined group seeking to codify parental rights, much like chil-
dren's rights have been codified in various forms. 23 This Article seeks
to explain why recent parental rights legislation has encountered op-
position and presents a Proposed Bill to Preserve the Right of Family
Integrity that will focus on the family as a unit, with parental rights
being reinforced, and without jeopardizing the necessary protections
granted to children. By examining the historical and legal status of
both parents and children in the United States of America from early
colonial times through the present, this Article will demonstrate that
while parental rights have gradually been stripped away, children's
rights have continued to expand. The gravamen of this Article sug-
gests that existing legal policies and practices that fail to recognize
the family as a legal entity in and of itself, with its own precious set of
rights, have contributed to this nation's family crisis. By considering
families as a group of individuals with competing sets of rights, legis-
latures and the courts are also responsible for the current state of the
American family. Part II traces the best interest of the child doctrine;
where it came from, what it means, and demonstrates how it has been
overused and overextended. Part III examines what the legally recog-
nized rights of parents have been in the past and shows how those
rights have been threatened, or in some cases, altogether eradicated
in the best interest of the child. Part IV evaluates the opposing posi-
tions of both parental rights advocates and children's rights advo-
cates. The viewpoints and motivations of the recent parental rights
movement that seeks to codify parental rights are examined, and an
explanation of why these efforts have not been entirely successful will
be presented. Part V discusses the problems encountered when the
debate becomes polarized and presents proposals directed at strength-
ening families by empowering parents through the resurrection of the
previously recognized, but more recently neglected, "right to family in-
tegrity." Part VI presents suggestions for strengthening the proposed
Senate Bill 984: The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Bill, in light
of preserving family integrity with the best interests of the parents,
children, and family as a unit. Part VII proffers a proposed bill on
preserving family integrity.
tional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing that there
is a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter").
23. See e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901; Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 622-625); 42 U.S.C. § 12,301 (2000); Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
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A. Exordium
Any legislation directed toward strengthening families must be
presented in the context of the American family today, not the Ameri-
can family of the 1950s. In no way should family preservation require
a denigration of the rights of women in society, nor children. Instead,
legislation should be directed toward empowering all families includ-
ing single-parent and two-parent families, families with full-time
stay-at-home mothers, and families whose mother chooses to work
outside the home. Granted, the traditional two-parent family has long
been the Judeo-Christian ideal upon which American family law was
based, but that ideal has been eroded in recent years. 24 In today's
legal system, family form has less significance. 2 5 The reality today is
that most children are no longer being raised in traditional two-parent
families with the father as the breadwinner and the mother as a full-
time homemaker. Rather, the majority of children are living in house-
holds where both parents work outside the home, or with a single par-
ent, or one parent and a stepparent. 2 6 The stable two-parent family is
certainly a worthy ideal and could continue to be society's goal. Stud-
ies have consistently shown that children who are raised by both bio-
logical parents living together are generally healthier, obtain higher
levels of achievement, and exhibit fewer conduct and emotional
problems than children brought up in single-parent or stepparent
families. 2 7 These studies do not indicate that it is inevitable that chil-
dren raised in single-parent households are all destined to have seri-
ous problems, but they do exhibit a significant risk which may be
offset by other factors, such as parental competence, the parental sup-
port system, the degree of parental education and income level, and
24. See Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ.
489, 499 (1996).
25. See id. at 500. Courts no longer distinguish between the rights of married and
unmarried parents. Illegitimate children have the same rights to parental sup-
port, inheritance, and welfare benefits, as children whose parents were married
at the time of birth. Id.
Courts have also recognized the parental rights of gay/lesbian parents, step-
parents, grandparents, etc. See e.g., Riddle v. Riddle, 775 S.W.2d 513 (Ark. App.
1989) (granting visitation rights to stepfather); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d
1207 (Mass. 1980) (finding no evidence to suggest a correlation between mother's
homosexuality and her fitness as a parent); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va.
1981) (rejecting per se rule of unfitness of homosexual parents and finding homo-
sexual conduct another important consideration in determining custody).
26. See Younger, supra note 24, at 500.
27. Studies such as the National Survey of Children, the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth, the National Health Interview Survey on Child Health, and others
have produced generally compatible results. See Causes of Poverty, with a Focus
on Out-of-Wedlock Births: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 46-49 (1996) (statement of
Nicholas Zill, Ph.D., Vice-President and Director, Child and Family Studies, Wes-
tat, Inc.).
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the emotional stability of the single parent. 28 When the two-parent
ideal is not possible, society should provide strength and support to
other family forms.
B. The Definition of a Parent
Although a parent2 9 is one who is the "lawful father or mother of
someone,"3 0 the term encompasses so much more today than just the
biological aspect of who was responsible for the child's conception and
birth. The word "parent" carries the connotation that there is a rela-
tionship of mutual love and affection between the parents and the
child and that the parents are the individuals who are responsible for
child support and maintenance, instruction, discipline, and guidance
of the child.31 Almost every person who has experienced parenthood
could attest that the parent-child bond is one of the most powerful of
all human emotions, extremely resilient and not easily severed.
It is equally important to note that a person does not necessarily
have to be defined as a parent to have rights equivalent to a parent. A
guardian is defined as "[olne who has the legal authority and duty to
care for another's person or property, especially because of the other's
infancy, incapacity, or disability."3 2 A court may also appoint an indi-
vidual, often it is an attorney to act as a guardian in a lawsuit, and
this is termed a guardian ad litem.3 3 Guardians have the same legal
duties as those of parents, and they often feel some form of love and
affection for the child in their care. Today, many grandparents are the
primary caregiver for children. According to the American Association
28. Id.
29. This Article discusses parents' rights in relation to the best interest of the child.
At this time, it is important to mention that biological parents mean the male
and female whose biological components produced the child. However, courts
have recognized as parents people who are not the biological producers of the
child. Whether or not state legislators or courts recognize same-sex marriages
and homosexual partners as parents is not at issue in this Article and, as such,
will not be discussed. It is an important topic to be discussed as a separate article
in light of San Francisco, California granting marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. See San Francisco Challenges State's Same-Sex Marriage Ban in Court,
CNN.coM, Feb. 19, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/19/samesex.marri
age/index.html. Several states have also adopted Defense of Marriage Acts,
which only allow marriages to be between a male and female. At least thirty-
eight states have passed Defense of Marriage Acts. See Kevin R. Corlew, Note,
Not on "Shaky Grounds": Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), and the Con-
stitutionality of State DOMAs Such as Nebraska's Marriage Provision, NEB.
CoNsT. art. § 29, 83 NEB. L. REV. 179, 186-87 n.63 (2004) (detailing the status of
state laws as of late 2004).
30. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
31. See Solberg v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 185 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Wis. 1971).
32. BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004). A guardian is also commonly re-
ferred to as a custodian, depending on the jurisdiction.
33. Id.
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of Retired Persons Grandparent Information Center, in 2001, approxi-
mately 4.5 million grandchildren under the age of eighteen resided in
grandparent-headed households.34 Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court has already addressed a case, Troxel v. Granville,35 on third-
party visitation, specifically involving grandparents and grandparent
visitation. 36
C. The Bundle of Common Law Parents' Rights
Neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Bill of Rights mentions pa-
rental rights or the rights of children. However, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the right to raise children is a funda-
mental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 7
Some of the judicially recognized rights included in the bundle of pa-
rental rights are the right of parents to the custody and care of their
minor children,38 the right to direct their children's moral and relig-
ious training,39 the right to establish their children's residence, 4 0 the
34. A. KIMBERLY DAYTON ET AL., ELDER LAw: READINGS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 542
(2d ed. 2003). See also AARP Website, www.aarp.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2004).
35. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
36. The Court reasoned that custody, care, and nurture of child reside first with par-
ents, whose primary function and freedom include preparing for obligations that
the State can neither supply nor hinder. There is also a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children. However, this reasoning has
provided for many state courts to dismiss already awarded grandparent visita-
tion awards and orders. Many state courts have used the Troxel Court's holdings
to limit the real best interest of the child, because the Troxel Court failed to es-
tablish any kind of analysis for determining the best interest of the parents. Id.
37. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116-17 (1996); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court, in Prince, when referencing its
prior holdings regarding the right of parents to direct the religious training and
upbringing of their children, reinforced its stance on the sanctity of the family:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And
it is in recognition of this that these decisions have respected the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
321 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted).
And more recently, in M.L.B. v. S.L.J.. Justice Ginsburg reiterated the funda-
mental right to raise children when she stated "[cihoices about marriage, family
life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights this Court has
ranked as 'of basic importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the Fourteenth
Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disre-
spect." 519 U.S. at 116 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
38. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981).
39. See, e.g., Pierce, 260 U.S. at 534, 535; Waites v. Waites, 567 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.
1978).
40. See, e.g., Shea v. Shea, 223 P.2d 32, 32-34 (Cal. App. 1950).
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right to the services and earnings of minor children, 4 1 the right to con-
trol and manage minor child's property,4 2 the right to direct the edu-
cation and religious instruction of their children, 4 3 the right to
consent to the minor child's medical treatment, 44 and the tort doctrine
of parental immunity for parents who are negligent in the exercise of
their parental duties. 45 Likewise, courts have charged parents with
the duty to discipline their minor children,4 6 and the duty to provide
their children with support, education, and protection.4 7 Further dis-
cussion infra will illustrate how these common law parental rights
have been diminished by legislatures and state courts under the aus-
pices of the best interest of the child. The correlation between the
diminishment of parental rights, the overextension of children's
rights, and the decline of the American family cannot be ignored.
II. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
While there was no mention of children in the U.S. Constitution
nor in the Bill of Rights, children have been granted many of the same
rights as adults. This section will demonstrate the evolutionary pro-
cess beginning with the development of the "best interest of the child"
doctrine, the historical role of the parent as protector, and how courts
41. See, e.g., Peot v. Ferraro, 266 N.W. 2d 586, 588 (Wis. 1978) ("A parent is entitled
to a minor child's wages as a matter of right."). The more modern trend, however,
is to view the loss of the right to a child's wages and services in the context of a
loss of consortium claim. See e.g., Frank v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 955, 959
(Ariz. 1986) (allowing parents to recover for loss of adult child's consortium).
42. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 835 (Alaska 1976).
43. Three U.S. Supreme Court cases have addressed the parental right to direct their
children's education or activities. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (striking down
an Oregon compulsory school attendance statute as violative of Amish parent's
right to control their children's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(declaring unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting the instruction of foreign
languages in public schools until students have completed the eighth grade); see
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to re-
move their children from public school and provide them with vocational training
in accordance with Amish community life and religious beliefs).
44. See, e.g., Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979).
45. See, e.g., Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d 822, 823 (Ill. App. 1997)
(extending the doctrine of parental immunity to foster parents, because here the
charge of negligence arose out of foster parents' supervision and discipline of the
child).
46. See, e.g., Niewiadomski v. U.S., 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 850 (1947). This case dealt with the right of a person in loco parentis to
receive life insurance benefits. But addressing parental rights in general the
court stated that "[a]t common law a parent is charged with the duty of educating
and supporting a minor child,.... together with the authority to take such disci-
plinary measures as are reasonably necessary to discharge the parental duty."
Id. at 686.
47. See, e.g., In Interest of George, 794 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (inter-
preting a Texas Family Code provision concerning duties of parents).
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and lawmakers have overextended the "best interest of the child" doc-
trine to the detriment of parental authority.
A. The Evolution of the "Best Interest of the Child"
Doctrine
The "best interest of the child" doctrine is not a new legal concept.
Courts have been using the phrase for years both in legal rulings and
dicta. When early American courts were called upon to adjudicate
child custody disputes, the best interest of the child was frequently
mentioned as a primary consideration to support the court's applica-
tion of, or deviation from, the general rule of the period.
American child custody law evolved from the European view of"ab-
solute paternal power,"48 to a presumption in favor of the mother for
children of tender years,4 9 to a general maternal preference. 50
Around 1960, maternal preference began to be pushed aside as a new
best interest of the child standard took hold.51 By 1970, when society
began responding to gender inequities exposed by feminists, most
states began to adopt no-fault divorce laws and remove the gender-
based bias in custody decisions.52 The changing statutes, coupled
with an enlightened judiciary regarding various psychological theories
being promulgated by social scientists, resulted in the development of
two opposing models of child custody, both purporting to be in the best
interest of the child.53
The first of these was the primary caretaker theory, based upon
the influential work published in 1973, Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child.54 This book was the product of three experts from different
disciplines: legal scholar Joseph Goldstein, child analyst Anna Freud,
and psychiatrist Albert Solnit. Their theory asserted that the parent
who fulfilled the primary childcare functions, although this need not
necessarily be the mother, should become the sole custodian of the
child.55 The primary caretaker, or the "psychological parent," is the
person who has had the majority of the "day-to-day interaction, com-
panionship, and shared experiences" with the child and could be "a
48. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other
Fictions, in CHILD, PARENT & STATE: LAw AND POLICY READER 3, 4 (S. Randall
Humm et al. eds., 1994).
49. The tender-years doctrine created a rebuttable presumption in favor of granting
custody to mothers of young children, reflecting a stereotype that a mother's nur-
ture would provide a young child with the healthiest development. Id. at 7.
50. Id.
51. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE His-
TORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 121, 122 (1994).
52. See id. at 125.
53. See id. at 167, 168.
54. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973).
55. See MASON, supra note 51, at 168.
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biological parent or an adoptive parent or any other caring adult-but
never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological or legal re-
lationship to the child may be."56 This is the person with whom the
child has formed the closest bond.57 One particularly controversial as-
pect of this theory, although it never received judicial acceptance, was
that the psychological parent should be granted the complete and ex-
clusive custody of the child, with sole control over all decisions regard-
ing the welfare of the child-including the decision to deny access to
the noncustodial parent.58
As the primary caretaker doctrine was gaining acceptance and rec-
ognition, another conflicting model emerged-a joint custody model-
that stressed the importance of the presence of both parents in the
child's development.59 This model was first introduced in California
in 1980.60 Swiftly gaining approval by the courts, it seemed to offer
the ideal solution: judges could render decisions in the best interest of
the child without appearing to favor one parent over the other.6 1 By
1988, thirty-six other states had followed California's great
experiment. 62
Clearly the use and acceptance of two directly opposing models,
both of which are purported to be in the best interest of the child,
leaves little doubt that there has been no clear-cut means of determin-
ing the best interest of a child. While some states have provided a list
of factors to be considered by the courts, other states have granted
broad judicial discretion. 6 3 Regardless, there seems to be no agree-
56. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 17, 19. The authors further assert:
Unlike adults, children have no psychological conception of relationship
by blood-tie until quite late in their development .... What registers in
their minds are the day-to-day interchanges with the adults who take
care of them and who, on the strength of these, become the parent
figures to whom they are attached.
Id. at 12-13.
57. See MASON, supra note 51, at 168, 169.
58. See id. at 168, 169.
59. See id. at 170.
60. See id. at 130.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 131. Mason refers to this preference as an experiment, because by the
time it was widely used, several unanticipated problems were noted, e.g., the con-
voluted schedules imposed on the children and an intensified degree of parental
conflict. Id. at 130, 131.
63. See Charlow, supra note 48. See e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(f)(1)(c)-(e)
(Anderson 2003) ("tlhe child's interaction and interrelationship with his par-
ents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest; [tihe child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; [t]he men-
tal and physical health of all persons involved in the situation"). For a broader,
less precise example, see N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987) ("An order for cus-
tody of a minor child entered pursuant to this section shall award the custody of
such child to such person, agency, organization or institution as will best promote
the interest and welfare of the child. An order for custody must include findings
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ment on what the words truly mean. The term is vague, illusive, and
subject to myriad interpretations. Nonetheless, it has become the uni-
versal standard used today in adjudicating custody battles between
biological parents, and between a parent and a third party upon a
finding that a parent is unfit.64
While the best interest of the child standard used today to resolve
custody disputes is arguably preferable to the rigid and inflexible
rules of the past, the actual application of the doctrine has failed to
achieve its theoretical purpose.6 5 Child custody law simply cannot ig-
nore the constitutional protections provided to the parents. 66
Synchronal with the exploding divorce rate, single-parent fami-
lies-usually headed by mothers living in poverty-became the new
underprivileged class in America.6 7 Mindful of the growing popularity
of the best interests of children, the states began to take an even more
active role as "superparent" by dictating stricter standards of behavior
for poor families.6 8 Social service agencies "vigilantly supervised the
behavior of those it supported," using the threat of removal and termi-
nation of parental rights for parents who did not conform.6 9
The newly extolled best interest of the child standard was not re-
served for resolving child custody matters, but became the maxim for
virtually every aspect of the burgeoning children's rights movement.
One legal scholar has aptly characterized the best interest of the child
application as a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of whether so-
ciety's view of the best interest of the child (as represented by the
State), outweighs the parental interest in making that
determination.70
of fact which support the determination of what is in the best interest of the
child."). Charlow proposes that a best.interest of the child. determination be
made by a court considering which parent is the most reasonable parent, i.e., the
parent who is most willing to avoid conflict and put aside his or her own interest,
is the parent who has the best interest of the child in mind. A 'most reasonable
parent rule" would minimize the number of disputes that actually go to trial, and
at trial, the burden would be on the parents to show why they could not agree.
The parent who has acted most unreasonably, in the opinion of the court, will not
be granted custody. Charlow, supra note 48, at 12-17.
64. See Gary M. Miller, Note, Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of
Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 1271, 1278 n.61 (1995).
65. See Charlow, supra note 48, at 4.
66. See Miller, supra note 64, at 1280. Miller argues that when courts make a best
interest determination, they could be infringing on a parent's constitutionally
protected religious freedom if a preference for one parent's religious practice
prevails over the others.
67. MASON, supra note 51, at 122.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Dis-
putes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 169 (1983).
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The current children's rights movement has brought children a
number of newly recognized rights, through legislation or judicial de-
cision, that had previously been unnecessary. When the first juvenile
court was established in 1899, it was founded upon the premise that it
would be in a child's best interest if the State would operate special-
ized courts, the purpose of which would be to provide state guidance in
the form of rehabilitation rather than punishment.71 Since these
courts were ostensibly operating in the best interest of children, a great
many procedural safeguards were considered unnecessary.72 Eventu-
ally, the United States Supreme Court held that certain procedural
safeguards were indeed necessary. The landmark decision of In re
Gault73 dealt with a fifteen-year-old who had been committed to a
state rehabilitation institution for six years after having been found
guilty of making obscene phone calls, an offense that carried a maxi-
mum of two months jail time for an adult. Here, the Court extended
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to juvenile court
proceedings.7 4
Gault is representative of the beginning of an entirely new era in
children's rights.75 As will be further evinced in the discussion that
follows, the rights of children quickly extended beyond the juvenile
court process. 76 While matters concerning family have always tradi-
tionally been a matter of state concern, the past two decades have pro-
duced a plethora of federal legislation promulgated in the interest of
children.7 7
71. CHILD, PARENT & STATE: LAW AND POLICY READER xxi (S. Randall Humm et al.
eds., 1994).
72. See id.
73. 387 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1967).
74. See id. at 19. Some juvenile court due process limitations remained, however, as
evinced by the Court's refusal, four years later, to extend the right to a trial by
jury to delinquency hearings. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (reasoning that if juveniles were granted the right to a jury
trial in delinquency proceedings, then there would be no need for juvenile courts,
since they would, in effect, be the same as other criminal courts).
75. LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 1.03, at 12 (Donald T. Kramer ed., 2d ed. 1994).
76. See id. § 1.04, at 15.
77. See id. § 1.04, at 16-17. Kramer includes a partial listing of some of the federal
laws pertaining to children:
[T]he Bilingual Education Act of 1988, the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Child Support Enforcement Amendments
of 1984, the Child Support Enforcement Program, the Child Victims' and
Child Witnesses' Rights Act of 1990, the Food Stamp Program and the
National School Lunch Program, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (now mostly su-
perseded by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990), the
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, the Child Sexual Abuse and
Pornography Act of 1986, the Federal Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act, the Abandoned Infants Assistance Act of 1988,
the Elementary and Secondary School Improvement Amendments of
2005] 1253
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
B. The Role of Guardians Ad Litem and Court Appointed
Special Advocates
Gault, and the Court's recognition of the necessity of protecting
children's best interests by granting them certain procedural due pro-
cess rights, led to the development of two new, and closely related,
legal mechanisms for protecting children's rights: guardians ad litem
and Court Appointed Special Advocates ("CASAs").78 Initially, a num-
ber of states passed statutes granting a child the right to legal repre-
sentation in cases of abuse or neglect, but by 1973, only two states
required guardians ad litem in every case of child abuse.79 In the fol-
lowing year, this area of the law began an era of rapid expansion after
the federal government passed a statute creating the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect ("NCCAN").80 NCCAN was responsible
for allocating federal grants to states that complied with federal
guidelines regarding child abuse and neglect programs.8 1 One of
these guidelines required states to appoint guardians ad litem in
every civil or criminal proceeding involving child abuse. 8 2
C. Weaknesses of the "Best Interest of the Child" Doctrine
The illusive "best interest of the child" has become a clich6. With-
out a concrete legal definition, it has been subject to overuse and mis-
use. Too often, the "best interest of the child" is determined by
dispassionate third parties relying on empirical data gathered by so-
cial scientists. Furthermore, judges bring a certain amount of bias to
the rulings they make based upon their own propensities.8 3 Some le-
gal scholars argue that the best interest of the child is an ideal that
1988, the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Runaway and Homeless Youth
Act, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform
Act, the School Dropout Demonstration Assistance Act of 1988, the Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, the Missing Children Act
and the Missing Children's Assistance Act of 1984, the Victims of Child
Abuse Act of 1990, and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.
Id.
78. JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY
AND PROTECTION 114 (1991).
79. Robert S. Shepard, Jr. & Sharon S. England, "I Know the Child is My Client, But
Who Am 1?", 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1920 (1996).
80. See id. at 1920-21.
81. See id. at 1921.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154, 156 (Iowa 1966) (overturn-
ing lower court's decision to award custody to father over claims of maternal
grandparents, indicating that although both parties were fit, the father's lifestyle
was "unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stim-
ulating," but the grandparents were "stable, dependable, conventional, middle-
class, middlewest background").
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should not be taken too literally.8 4 In the articulately stated argu-
ment of another legal scholar:
[Clhildren cannot be adequately or even sensibly protected by giving them
rights that state officials will enforce against parents. Children can only be
protected by giving them parents. The children's rights movement today is
ignoring this simple homely truth, and thus disserving the best interests of
children. 8 5
Courts have further weakened the best interest of the child standard
by providing different applications of the standard. Many courts ap-
ply the standard only in certain situations or after a certain number of
elements are present, while other courts immediately apply the stan-
dard "under the presumption that the child's best interests are the
paramount consideration."8 6 "Courts and scholars also disagree on
the factors to be used and weight to be given to the rights in the
balance."8 7
III. THOSE LONGSTANDING PARENTAL
RIGHTS AND DUTIES
As the "best interest of the child" doctrine gained a stronghold in
American legal thought, the rights of parents gradually have been er-
oding. This Part will compare the common law parental rights and
duties recognized by early American courts with the rights and duties
of parents today. This comparison will illustrate how, as children
have been granted additional rights, the rights of parents to rear their
children in the manner they deem appropriate have been
compromised.
A. Parental Right to Custody and Care
During the formative years of American society, patriarchal rule
was still the dominant cultural practice of Western civilization.
Under English common law, the father was the ruler of the family,
with supreme power over his children, such power limited only in rare
84. HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 788
(2d ed. 1988).
85. BURT, supra note 17, at 51.
86. Elizabeth P. Miller, Note, Deboer v. Schmidt and Twigg v. Mays: Does the "Best
Interests of the Child" Standard Protect the Best Interests of Children?, 20 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 497, 508 (1994).
87. Id. at 509. Miller also mentions that "'state statutes rarely specify the factors to
be considered in determining the best interests of the child.'" Id. (quoting VIN-
CENT D. FRANCIS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS-BALANCING THE EQUITIES 8
(1971)). She raises the argument of "generic language" not providing courts and
parties with clear interpretation so that the standard often has different meaning
to different people. Id. at 509. See also Gloria Christopherson, Minnesota Devel-
opments, Minnesota Adopts a Best Interests Standard in Parental Rights Termi-
nation Proceedings: In re J.J.B., 71 MINN. L. REV. 1263 (1987).
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and extreme cases by the power of the State.8 8 This patriarchal sys-
tem flowed from the generally accepted Christian belief that man was
the head of the household.89 In colonial America and through the pe-
riod of early statehood, mothers were usually responsible for the in-
fant child who was nursing, but then abdicated much of the childcare
responsibility to the father once the child was weaned. Fathers were
not only responsible for making the decisions regarding the child's
welfare and education, but were usually active participants in the typ-
ical day-to-day activities involving the child.90
In rare cases of divorce, and as a consequence of our patriarchal
beliefs, a mother generally had no right to the custody of the children,
unless she could prove wrongful conduct on the part of the father.9 1
Legally, fathers were considered to be the "natural guardian, invested
by God and the law of the country with reasonable power over [the
children] ."92 As previously mentioned, it was not until the end of the
nineteenth century that child custody decisions began to apply a ma-
ternal preference.93
By the twentieth century, mother's rights had gained some recog-
nition, but generally only in the context of custody decisionmaking. 94
The early common-law concept that the totality of family rights was
88. See R. Collin Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitu-
tional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25,
30-44 (1981). This article gives a comprehensive analysis of the development of
child custody laws.
89. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD 46 (1993). Berry as-
serts that this patriarchal standard was founded upon the belief "that women
were sinful and moral inferiors, a belief deeply rooted in the Bible and the story of
Adam and Eve." Id. Since women were corrupt by nature, fathers were therefore
the better parent for overseeing the children's development.
90. See id. at 45.
91. See Miller, supra note 64, at 1278.
92. See, e.g., Prather v. Prather, 4 S.C. Eq. 33 (4 Des.) (1809). In this renegade deci-
sion, Chancellor Desaussure acknowledged the rights of the mother "to the com-
fort of her children's society occasionally; and the court will protect her in the
enjoyment of it." Id. at 39. The mother was granted what today would be known
as visitation rights to the older children, but was given custody of the nursing
child. Id. at 44.
93. See Katheryn L. Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial Decision-Making Regarding Cus-
tody of Minor Children: Looking at the "Best Interests of the Child" and the "Pri-
mary Caretaker" Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 389, 391 (1996).
94. In other cases, the vestiges of the patriarchal system were still apparent. In a
criminal case brought against a father's agents for removing his child from his
estranged wife's custody, the court held that the father's house "is the proper
residence of the family .... His authority over his children is superior to that of
their mother so long as they may reside together as husband and wife." State v.
Elliott, 131 So. 28, 30 (La. 1930). In a different type of case that dealt with a
contested inheritance, the court held that on the death of the father it is the right
and duty of the mother to exercise authority over her children. Cravens v.
Cravens, 61 S.W.2d 730, 740 (Mo. 1933).
1256 [Vol. 83:1240
1257THE JOURNEY TO FAMILY INTEGRITY
vested in the husband by reason of such doctrines as that of marital
unity of husband and wife and family unity of parent and child was
swept away by modern legislation.9 5 Eventually, and most likely as a
result of the woman's suffrage movement and the newly recognized
rights of women in general, courts began to recognize the rights of
both parents without reference to the parents' gender. By 1944, in
Prince v. Massachusetts,96 an eminently germane decision to the topic
at hand, the United States Supreme Court recognized the sanctity of
family rights by acknowledging that
the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that these deci-
sions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.
9 7
1. The Ultimate Sanction: The Termination of Parental Rights
Parental rights have never been absolute and are subject to state
intervention for parental abuse and neglect. When the safety and wel-
fare of a child is threatened, the State has the power to intervene
under the doctrine ofparens patriae, literally interpreted as "the State
is the parent." The various state statutes that authorize the involun-
tary termination of parental rights are extremely diverse, making it
difficult to determine any type of national consensus.
9 8 Major differ-
ences are found in the manner in which various state agencies define
the terms abuse and neglect. The state must intervene when there is
clear and convincing evidence9 9 that children have been subjected to
chronic physical or sexual abuse, torture, or abandonment. While bro-
95. Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Minn. 1949).
96. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
97. Id. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
98. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 894.
99. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring that all states use a clear
and convincing standard of proof, i.e., more than a preponderance of the evidence
but less than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard required in criminal pro-
ceedings, when seeking a termination of parental rights). In the Santosky case,
social services removed three children from the Santosky home and placed them
in foster care after a finding of neglect. The lower court found that, although the
Santoskys had maintained contact with the children, the visits were "superficial."
Id. at 751. The judge then terminated their parental rights upon concluding that
the Santoskys were not capable of planning for their children's future, even with
pubic assistance. The New York appellate court affirmed by attempting to bal-
ance the children's rights against the parents' rights, but the U.S. Supreme Court
overruled. The Court reasoned that the parents' right to custody is an interest
"more precious than property rights" and thus required a higher standard of
proof. Santosky noted that thirty other states already required the clear and con-
vincing standard either by statute or court decision. Id. at 749 n.3. As one com-
mentator has observed, the Santosky ruling does very little to protect parental
rights, since it did not overrule Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Dur-
ham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), decided the previous year, holding that states
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ken bones and serious bruises may serve as evidence of severe physi-
cal abuse, other types of abuse and neglect are more difficult to
discern.l0 0 Hence, there is serious danger of imposing middle-class
standards upon families living in poverty. In a 1971 California case,
Social Services attempted to remove all but the eldest child from the
family home based upon a statute that authorized state intervention
and removal of the children if the "home has become an unkempt and
unsanitary place of living."' 0 ' After two years of state supervision,
the family continued to live in a filthy house, the children were dirty,
and one child had lice. The parents asserted in their defense that they
were overweight, in poor health and unable to keep the house clean,
but they loved their children nonetheless. A social worker also testi-
fied that the parent-child relationship was intact, the children were
healthy and happy, and there was no evidence of cruelty. The trial
court still removed the children from the home for one year, and this
decision was affirmed on appeal.102 The basis for this decision was
the "best interests" doctrine justified by the court's discretionary
power: "The unfitness of a home for a particular child... is a relative
concept and it cannot be determined except by judicial appraisal of all
available evidence bearing on the child's best interests .... "103
Removal and termination statutes are often worded in a manner
that allows for a great deal of judicial discretion in determining what
is in the best interest of the child, thereby permitting judges to make
subjective decisions based upon a white, middle-class, perspective. 0 4
While some states have held that neglect, dependency, deprivation,
and non-support are adequate grounds for termination of parental
rights1O5 others have held that custody may only be forfeited to a
third person by proof that the parent is unfit.10 6 A charge of parental
need not provide counsel for children or indigent parents in termination proceed-
ings. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 867.
100. See MASON, supra note 51, at 151.
101. In the Matter of Deborah G., Georgia G., Bruce G., and Elizabeth G., 2d Civ. No.
40391 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 1973) (unpublished decision), quoted in MASON,
supra note 51, at 151 n.97.
102. Id. at 153. Mason notes that the statute was later modified and the language
regarding unsanitary conditions was removed. See id. at 151 n.99.
103. MACK, supra note 4, at 85 (quoting ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 506-09 (New York:
Little, Brown 1978)).
104. See Bohl, supra note 8. Bohl presents a credible argument for requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in termination proceedings.
105. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (Michie 2004); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7822-27
(West 2004).
106. See, e.g., Roche v. Roche, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (Cal. 1944) (reversing lower court
decision that granted custody to paternal grandparents absent proof that the
child's father was unfit) (citing In re White, 129 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. App. 1942)).
The right of a parent to the care and custody of a child cannot be taken
away merely because the court may believe that some third person can
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neglect undoubtedly provides states with the most power to make ar-
bitrary, or middle-class value-based decisions.1O7
Since states have the option of intervening in cases of alleged child
abuse under the civil child welfare proceedings and concurrently pros-
ecute under the criminal statutes, there is a significant risk that the
two separate proceedings will produce conflicting, anomalous, and ir-
reconcilable results. Although the United States Supreme Court has
required that states must use the clear and convincing standard of
proof to terminate parental rights,108 the criminal charges will always
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In one Texas case that received the attention of the national media,
the two proceedings did indeed produce anomalous results.109 This
judicial travesty began in 1989 when Mr. Krasniqi took his then 5-
year-old daughter with him to watch his 9-year-old son compete in a
tae kwon do tournament. The Krasniqi parents were Albanian immi-
grants who practiced the Muslim faith and had a limited command of
English. Another tournament spectator, seated behind Mr. Krasniqi
and his daughter, claimed to have seen the father rubbing his daugh-
ter in an unacceptable and inappropriate sexual manner. Several
other people, including a civilian employee of the local police depart-
ment, confirmed the allegations. The children were subsequently
placed in foster care with a Christian family. In the April 1990 civil
proceeding, following a three-day trial, a jury found that there was
clear and convincing evidence of abuse and terminated both parents'
rights to their children.11O Efforts to appeal failed mainly on procedu-
ral grounds." 1 ' Meanwhile, the children's foster family began adop-
give the child better care and greater protection. One of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public
policy, is the right to the care and custody of a minor child.
Id. But one commentator contends that the "unfitness" of a parent is the least
precise grounds for termination, and the most capable of confusion, since unfit-
ness refers to a condition of the parent, whereas neglect refers to the child's state.
See CLARK, supra note 84, at 903.
107. See, e.g., JKC v. Fountain County Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 470 N.E.2d 88 (Ind.
App. 1984) (involving the removal of two children from parents who were fre-
quently unemployed).
108. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982) (noting that a few states do
require the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard before parental rights are
terminated).
109. Sherry Jacobson, Questions Persist in Adoption of Muslim Family's 2 Children,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 29, 1995, at IA.
110. Mrs. Krasniqi lost her parental rights for defying a court order by taking her
daughter to visit the father at the family business, although Mrs. Krasniqi testi-
fied that she misunderstood the order, thinking that visits with the father were
permissible if Mrs. Krasniqi was also present. See id.
111. See Krasniqi v. Dallas County Child Protective Serv., 809 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1006 (1992), and cert. denied, 504 U.S. 940
(1992).
2005] 1259
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion proceedings. The adoptions were not finalized until 1994, but two
years earlier, in February 1992, the criminal proceedings had resulted
in a jury deadlock when the prosecution was unable to convince the
jury that Mr. Krasniqi was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child
sexual abuse. Two years later, the trial court rendered a not guilty
verdict based upon the convincing testimony of an expert in Albanian
culture.112 But that was too late for the Krasniqis, whose efforts to
regain custody of their children have been unsuccessful and their legal
bills have surpassed $200,000.00.
2. The Future of Foster Care and Its Threat to Family Integrity
Foster care policies in the United States initially focused on remov-
ing children from an unsafe environment and providing a safe place
for children to live until they could eventually be reunited with their
families. As a last resort, if reunification was not possible, parental
rights could be terminated and the children would be placed for adop-
tion. In efforts to reform the foster care system and alleviate the prob-
lem of too many children remaining in foster care limbo
indefinitely, 113 Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980.114 The Act provides federal funds to states that
comply with federal edicts requiring preventive and reunification ser-
vices directed at keeping families together.1 1 5
More recently, however, under the guise of protecting children and
promoting children's rights, politicians have embraced additional re-
112. The cultural expert spent several hours interviewing Mr. Krasniqi, and she was
convinced that he could not have been guilty of sexual abuse of his daughter.
Child sexual abuse is unheard of in Albania. Mr. Krasniqi was showing affection
by patting his daughter's buttocks. See Jacobson, supra note 109.
113. This legislation may have developed as a response to the ruling in Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families for Equality and Reforms, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (up-
holding state procedures that permitted the State to remove a foster child from
the foster family with minimal notice, while acknowledging that children may
have developed an emotional bond with foster family). Smith reasoned that the
foster family was created by state law, and thus the State already had a neces-
sary involvement with the family, as distinguished from natural families, which
are formed under an intrinsic human right. See id. at 836.
114. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500.
115. For a comprehensive analysis on the effects of the federal law, see Martin Gug-
genheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental
Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 121 (1995). Professor Guggenheim maintains that this federal law has in-
duced states to take a more aggressive approach in terminating parental rights
and that children are now "in a worse position than they were in before these
reforms were passed .... [, and] in an increasing number of cases, states are
destroying the legal relationship between parents and children for no good pur-
pose and ... as a result, a record number of children have become legal orphans."
Id. at 121-22.
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forms that will further deny parents the right to custody and control
over their children. This even more severe approach seeks to en-
courage states to terminate parental rights even more swiftly. Rather
than pursuing reunification of the family as in the best interest of the
child, the new approach is geared more toward developing a perma-
nency plan for the child.116 The Adoption Promotion Act further re-
duced the amount of time that states may devote to reuniting a family
and award "adoption incentive payments" to states based on the num-
ber of foster children whose parental rights are successfully termi-
nated and who are subsequently adopted by new families. 117
Congress is overlooking the fact that the best interests of the child
are most often fulfilled by the eventual reunification of families in cri-
sis.118 The family of origin has provided the child's source of identity;
116. The proposed changes to the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act intro-
duce language that will require the State to decide a permanent living arrange-
ment for the child. The State must present a "permanency plan" at the child's
"permanency hearing" (formally called a dispositional hearing). The permanency
plan will include "whether, and if applicable when, the child will be returned to
the parent, placed for adoption, and the State will file a petition for termination
of parental rights, or referred for legal guardianship, or . . . placed in another
planned permanent living arrangement." H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 13 (1997), re-
printed in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2745 (House Report of the Ways and Means
Committee to accompany H.R. 867, 105th Cong. (1997), codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 670(5)(C) (2000)).
117. See H.R. 867, 105th Cong. (1997). This bill was passed by an overwhelming ma-
jority (416-5) in the House of Representatives on April 30, 1997. Congresswoman
Mink of Hawaii was one of the few who expressed opposition to the bill. She
argued that the bill does not protect the rights of poor parents, and in light of the
welfare reform bill passed in 1996, there will undoubtedly be an increased num-
ber of parents who will be unable to provide for their young children. She as-
serted that she could not vote for a bill that results in:
the final penalty of poverty: The loss of ones' children by edict of the
Government. First you take their money away. Then you force them
into desperate conditions of poverty. Then you deem them unfit to raise
their children and you remove them from the home and place them in
foster homes. Then after 18 months you put the children up for
adoption.
143 CONG. REC. H2023 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Mink).
The Senate version of the bill (SAFEACT) differs from the House Bill in that it
does not mandate that states initiate termination proceedings along certain pro-
scribed timelines, but allows termination proceedings only after reasonable ef-
forts at reunification have been made, the case plan is for adoption (not foster
care limbo), and a court makes the determination that reunification is not in the
best interests of the child.
118. Family-Based Services ("FBS") uses an entirely different approach than the ad-
versarial method that child welfare services use today. Most child welfare agen-
cies are based on the assumption that children are victims and it is the role of
child welfare to protect children from incompetent parenting. A drastically dif-
ferent and immeasurably more beneficial method is to look at the family as a
unit, and thus the best way to help a child is to strengthen and empower the
family. FBS is a solution-based approach which seeks to provide intense family
therapy that teaches families techniques to deal with crisis and how to formulate
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no other love will substitute for that which the child believes would be
bestowed by his or her parents.11 9 Even when parents have failed to
provide adequate care and protection, the child has nonetheless devel-
oped a special psychological connection to them. Children who are
permanently removed from their families, and placed in a new perma-
nent family without being permitted to. maintain contact with the
original family, experience grief-like emotions, similar to the death of
a loved one. 120 These children are far more likely to suffer from dis-
tress associated to the loss, in addition to anxiety and fear that they
too could be forever banished like their parents.121 The psychological
effects of being torn away from one's parents, and/or one's siblings, by
the State can have long-term ramifications that often emerge as diffi-
culty coping throughout the person's life.122 These emotions may con-
tinually surface as the child grows to adulthood and experiences the
normal transitions of life, such as adolescence, marriage, childbirth,
deaths, or divorce.' 23
B. Parental Duty to Provide Discipline
Discipline has always been a controversial issue, but the relatively
recent movement aimed at protecting children who are victims of
abuse has brought about the creation of groups such as the National
Commission for Prevention of Child Abuse, who advocate for the com-
plete elimination of corporal punishment. These social reformers, or
"child welfare experts," assert that all corporal punishment must be
outlawed. It is an ineffective form of discipline which does nothing but
solutions. See INSoO KIM BERG, FAMILY-BASED SERVICES (1994). This book serves
as a social worker's guide to providing FBS.
119. Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental
Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397, 409
(1996). Johnson presents a persuasive argument for allowing children to main-
tain contact and a relationship with their family of origin, even when those fami-
lies are unable to properly care for the children. Prohibiting contact will have a
negative impact on the child, either because the absent parent will be idolized in
the child's mind, thus posing a barrier to the formation of new familial bonds, or
if the absent parents are denigrated in the child's mind, there will be a negative
impact on the child's self-esteem. See id. at 408.
120. See id. at 414.
121. See id. at 415.
122. In a letter published by advice columnist Ann Landers; a reader expressed anger
at being denied the family closeness that was taken from her several years ago by
"the system, social service, and child protective agencies" when she and her five
siblings were placed in separate foster homes. According to the writer, all the
children grew to be "hopeless drunks, as though [they] had set out to deliberately
destroy themselves." She now resents the efforts her foster family made to "oblit-
erate my past and transform me into a totally different person." Letter to advice
columnist Ann Landers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 11, 1997, at 2C.
123. See Johnson, supra note 119, at 414.
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teach children that violence is an acceptable form of solving
problems12 4 and thus should not be condoned by our culture.
The corporal punishment debate is not unique to the United
States. Six countries have passed legislation prohibiting parents from
using corporal punishment.125 Sweden was the first country to pass
such legislation in 1979, against the vast majority of public opinion.
Since the law became a part of the Swedish civil code, rather than the
criminal code, parents in violation are not subjected to any type of
criminal penalty. Nevertheless, regardless of its largely symbolic
form, supporters of the law believe it sends a necessary social message
and credit it with success in breaking the inter-generational cycle of
abuse. 126
In spite of the criticisms, corporal punishment, or the use of physi-
cal force as a form of discipline, is deeply rooted in Western culture
and is sanctioned by the Old Testament. 12 7 The majority of Ameri-
cans still believe that parents must have the option of using corporal
punishment in order to raise children effectively.12 8 They believe that
reasonable corporal punishment builds character, serves as a deter-
rent for future acts of bad behavior and teaches children to obey and
respect authority. 12 9
Corporal punishment is still permitted in every state, either under
state statute or common law. 130 But in spite of its legality, parents
are confused and uncertain because of the extent of state involvement
in this realm of family life.131 Many parents believe that the influence
of child welfare authorities, which begins as soon as children enter
public schools, is destructive to family life. 132 Children are given lists
of their rights, told to report parents who spank, and are even taught
that verbal discipline can be "abusive."13 3
124. VINCENT J. FONTANA, M.D. & VALERIE MOOLMAN, SAVE THE FAMILY, SAVE THE
CHILD 104 (1991).
125. These countries are: Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Poland, and Norway.
See Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 983, 1018-19 (1996).
126. See id. at 1018.
127. See e.g., Proverbs 23:12-14 ("Withhold not correction from the child; for if thou
beatest him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and
shalt deliver his soul from hell."). We often hear many adults say they appreciate
the strong discipline they received as a child. They feel as adults that they de-
served the spankings. Perhaps many adults (parents) feel this way as they have
their own children.
128. See Edwards, supra note 125, at 984.
129. See id. at 990.
130. See id. at 984.
131. See MACK, supra note 4, at 20.
132. See id. at 19.
133. Id. at 20.
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While the position of American jurisprudence has been to recognize
that parents are privileged to use reasonable force when necessary to
maintain proper control and training of the child,134 such a right has
its limitations. A parent is not permitted to "punish with undue sever-
ity or cruelty, or only because he is angered with the child," but the
parent must act with the best interest of the child in mind.135
Of course, when punishment is reasonable versus when it becomes
cruel and excessive is not always crystal clear. Most courts use broad
language that allows for fact-specific application of the general rule.
For example, one court has asserted that a parent has the legally rec-
ognized "authority to take such disciplinary measures as are reasona-
bly necessary to discharge the parental duty."13 6 Therefore, it is up to
the courts to determine when parents have exceeded the boundaries of
reasonable punishment, and when they should be charged with crimi-
nal child abuse.
Part of the difficulty in making these types of determinations
arises because social policies and beliefs change over time and fre-
quently vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The corporal punish-
ment produced by our parents would very likely be considered cruel
and excessive punishment today, but yet it was probably not nearly as
severe as the punishments our parents endured at the hands of our
grandparents. This social and cultural evolution is so perfectly mani-
fested by contrasting an 1886 case from North Carolina with a 1980
case from the State of Washington. The North Carolina appellate
court took notice of the following facts:
134. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "A parent is privileged to apply such
reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he
reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training or education."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(1) (1965). Section 150 lists the following
factors which should be used in determining whether the punishment was
reasonable:
(a) whether the actor is a parent;
(b) age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child;
(c) the nature of the offense and his apparent motive;
(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same family
or group;
(e) whether the force or confinement is necessary and appropriate to
compel obedience to a proper command; and
(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading
or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.
Id. § 150.
135. State v. Fischer, 60 N.W. 2d 105, 109 (Iowa 1953) (upholding conviction of four-
teen-year-old found guilty of the second-degree murder of his father, based upon
finding that child was not acting in self-defense because the father's punishment
of sending the boy to his room to be dealt with later was not unreasonable or
abusive, but was corrective in nature).
136. Niewiadomski v. United States, 159 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 850 (1947).
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Mary C. Jones, aged 16 claimed that her father frequently whipped her with-
out cause and on one occasion he whipped her 25 times before witnesses at the
front gate with a switch or small limb, about the size of a thumb1 3 7 which
produced welts on her back. He then went into the house, quickly returned,
whipped her five more times then choked her and threw her to the ground,
causing a dislocation of her thumb. Her stepmother testified that she was
habitually disobedient, had several times stolen money, and was chastised on
that occasion for stealing some cents from her father. No permanent injury
was sustained. 1 3 8
The jury convicted the father for criminal assault and battery, how-
ever the appellate court reversed the conviction and took notice that
while the discipline was "needlessly severe," it was not criminal since
no permanent injury resulted and the action did not arise from pure
malice.139
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court asserted that pa-
rental rights were not violated when the state granted a fifteen-year-
old girl's petition seeking "alternative residential placement."140 The
vague facts recited by the majority indicate only that there had been a
great deal of unresolved family conflict and the child had run away on
a number of occasions. 14 1 The court acknowledged that even without
any claim of physical abuse, or parental unfitness, or neglect, the best
interest of the child and the State in protecting the mental and emo-
tional health of the child outweighed the parent's right in this case to
the custody and care of their child.142 The dissent, however, asserted
that the basis for the court's decision, and the "sum and substance" of
the juvenile's testimony, was the child's belief that she could not com-
municate with her parents because of the rules they established that
she "not use drugs, or associate with those who had furnished drugs,
that she not use alcohol, that she not be sexually active, and that she
be in at a reasonable hour."143
The controversial issues at the core of a parent's exercise of the
duty to discipline his or her children are: what type of punishment is
reasonable, when is state intervention necessary, and when does state
intervention exceed its boundaries? In a highly publicized 1994 case
in Woodstock, Georgia, the authorities clearly crossed the line when
they arrested Lynn Kivi for felony child abuse for slapping her unruly
son in a public supermarket. An employee who witnessed the slap
called the police, who promptly appeared, handcuffed Mrs. Kivi, and
took her to jail. After an exhaustive investigation of the Kivi family by
the authorities, charges were eventually dropped two months later.
137. An application of the rule of thumb, perhaps?
138. State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588 (1886).
139. Id. at 592-93.
140. In re Welfare of Sumey, 621 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1980).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 111-12.
143. Id. at 114 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
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But the emotional anguish this family endured, and the economic
losses they suffered, cannot so easily be dismissed.144
In the same vein, the state of Ohio recently revised its criminal
domestic violence statute to include crimes against children. The law
provides that "no person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause
physical harm to a family or household member."145 The first offense
is classified as a first-degree misdemeanor, and a second offense is a
fifth-degree felony. The language of the statute presents a low stan-
dard of what constitutes "physical harm." In state appellate decisions,
courts have overturned lower courts which have not considered the
defendant's affirmative defense of corporal punishment.14 6 Reasona-
bleness may be determined by examining the totality of the circum-
stances, including the child's age, behavior and response to
noncorporal punishment, as well as the location and severity of the
punishment.147
1. Juvenile Justice-The State, the Parent and the Child
Although a thorough discussion of the juvenile justice system's his-
torical development and intricacies is far beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, the topic does merit discussion in the context of its role in the
relationship between the parental rights and the relatively recently
recognized rights of children. The component of juvenile justice that
this Article will examine is the area of status offenses, also known in
some jurisdictions as "PINS" (Persons In Need of Supervision) or
"CHINS" (Children in Need of Supervision) statutes.
Historically state intervention in the parent-child relationship in
the area of child discipline was not for the purpose of protecting chil-
dren from unreasonable corporal punishment inflicted by parents, but
was justified under the doctrine of parens patriae to protect children
from self-destructive behaviors. State intervention was also available
to parents who felt that they could no longer control their children's
behavior. 148
144. Author, Mother Won't Face Felony Charges for Slapping Son, 9, at Supermarket,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994, at 3A.
145. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(A) (Anderson 2004).
146. See, e.g., State v. Hart, 673 N.E.2d 992 (Ohio App. 3d 1996) (finding that the
father's slaps to daughter's face or head could be considered corporal punishment
under the totality of the circumstances). See also State v. Wagster, No. C-950584,
1996 WL 134538 (Ohio App. 1999) (finding that corporal punishment was reason-
able when a twelve-year-old child was out of control and screaming, and her fa-
ther slapped her on the back to calm her down).
147. See Hart, 673 N.E.2d at 995.
148. As early as colonial America when parents were unable to control their children,
the government intervened under the authority of "stubborn children" statutes.
One such 1654 statute enacted by the House of Deputies of the Colony of Massa-
chusetts Bay stated: "it appeares by too much experience that divers children &
servants does behave themselves too disrespectively, disobediently, & disorderly
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Statutes requiring children to obey their parents, and providing for
state-inflicted punishment should they not obey, were enacted not
only in Massachusetts, which permitted such a child to be "put to
death," but also in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hamp-
shire.' 4 9 The modern equivalent of these antiquated stubborn child
statutes are found in every state, in some form or another, through
the enactment of juvenile status offense legislation. A status offender
is a person who, because of his or her age, comes within the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court, after exhibiting behavior that the State has
an interest in preventing or eliminating. 150 These behaviors include
named offenses like truancy, curfew violations, or repeated attempts
to run away from home.151 Some states also include general catch-all
language that may apply to disobedient, unruly or incorrigible chil-
dren, whose behavior is beyond the control of their parents. 152
Once upon a time, parents could look to the state for help in deal-
ing with errant teens. But many states no longer fulfill that function.
The state's refusal to intervene is illustrated through the experience of
one New York family as reported in a March 1997 news account. 153 A
16-year-old girl ran away from home and moved in with an older boy-
friend. Her mother contacted the police who informed her that since
her daughter was sixteen "'she can go wherever she wants, live wher-
ever she wants.'"154 Child Protective Services gave the same re-
sponse. The mother turned to the courts and made an unsuccessful
attempt to file a PINS petition. The child did not qualify for PINS
because, at age sixteen, she was considered an emancipated minor.
towards their parents, masters, & governours, to the disturbance of families, &
discouragement of such parents & governours," and provided for "corporal pun-
ishment by whipping, or otherwise," for such behavior. Commonwealth v.
Brasher, 270 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Mass. 1971) (citing Mass. Bay Records, Vol. III
(1644-1657), 35 Mass. Col. Laws (1887 ed.) 27). In Brasher, the court upheld a
revised version of this original seventeenth-century statute and asserted that it
was in the State's interest to insure harmonious relationships between family
members, and between the family and the rest of society. The State has author-
ity to "aid the head of a family unit whose reasonable and lawful commands are
being disobeyed by children bound to obey them." Id. at 394.
149. John R. Sutton, Stubborn Children: Law and Socialization of Deviance in the Pu-
ritan Colonies, 15 FAM. L.Q. 31 (1981) (citing M. FARRAND, THE LAws AND LIBER-
TIES OF MASSACHUSETTS (1648) 6 (1929); N. SHURTLEFF, RECORDS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 1628-1686
101 (1854)).
150. See Jan C. Costello & Nancy L. Worthington, Incarcerating Status Offenders: At-
tempts To Circumvent the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 16
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 41 (1981).
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Ed Lowe, Mother's Life Jarred by Crisis, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7, 1997, at A08.
154. Id.
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Upon finding that she had absolutely no legal authority to recover her
child, the mother made the following telling comment:
"'It's too easy for these children. That's why so many of them are pregnant.
That's why so many run away. They have the right to. There's nothing wrong
with it. The law says there's nothing wrong with it, and there is something
wrong with it. There is something wrong. It's ridiculous. She's a child. She's
a kid.'" 1 5
5
C. Parental Right to Children's Services and Control of
Children's Wages
Colonial families were economically dependent on each member of
the family for their mutual survival.156 Children as young as seven
years old worked alongside their parents, the boys with their fathers
in the fields, the girls with their mothers performing domestic
tasks.157 It is a common misconception today that children were con-
sidered property under the common law.15s Throughout most of our
history, however, children were considered economic assets and their
labor was considered a precious resource to parents. 159 The fa-
ther-child relationship was based upon a mutual set of obligations:
the father had the obligation to support and educate the child, and, in
return for that support, the father was entitled to the value of the
child's services. 16 0
In America's largely agrarian society, the practice of child labor
within the home was never questioned. The beginning of the nine-
teenth century brought urbanization to America and the public senti-
ment regarding the role of children began to change. 16 1 As families
became smaller, the new urban middle class began to view children in
a more positive light, as "innocent beings who were naturally closer to
God."162 These children needed the nurture and protection of their
mothers.
While the status of middle class children improved, the status of
poor children remained unchanged. Industrialists depended upon the
growing population of immigrant children as a source of cheap labor.
Some historians have postulated that factory owners preferred these
children over adult workers because they were cheaper, more pliant
and reliable, and less likely to strike.163 In 1904, children's advocates
formed the National Child Labor Committee which espoused the belief
155. Id.
156. HAwEs, supra note 78, at 45-46.
157. Id.
158. See MASON, supra note 51, at xii.
159. See id. at xii.
160. See id. at 7.
161. See id. at 51.
162. Id. at 52.
163. See HAwEs, supra note 78, at 41.
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that childhood is sacred, and the exploitation of young children was a
degradation to humanity. As one commentator suggested, the Na-
tional Child Labor Committee became the first national organization
devoted to the welfare of American children and thus became the pro-
totype for other protective child advocacy organizations.164
History dictates the logical inference that the sharp increase in the
usage of child labor was probably two-fold: poor, working-class fami-
lies could better their economic status, and child labor promoted in-
dustrial and economic growth for the nation. Children from the upper
and middle classes were not working, but children from poor families
were, resulting in divided public opinion based upon class lines. Poor
parents who had previously maintained control over the wages and
services of their children, felt the threat to their economic welfare.16 5
Many poor parents struggled to understand this new type of par-
ent-child relationship; one in which the obligations and duties were
only one-sided-with parents retaining their duty to support their mi-
nor children, but the children having no corresponding obligation to
contribute to the family's economic welfare.16 6 One by one, and in
large part because of the efforts of the National Child Labor Commit-
tee, the northern states began enacting various state laws regulating
child labor.167 In the South, particularly in the cotton industry, em-
ployers continued to rely heavily on child labor.168 Some mills worked
children as young as six or seven years old for twelve hours per day,
with only one thirty-minute break.169
Children's advocates began a national campaign directed at enact-
ing federal legislation to regulate, and to a large degree prohibit alto-
gether, child labor. The first in a series of various acts was the
Keating-Owen Act of 1916. This act prohibited any industry involved
in interstate commerce from employing any child under the age of
fourteen, and severely limited the labor performed by children ages
fourteen through sixteen. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,1 7° the U.S. Su-
preme Court declared the Owen-Keating Act unconstitutional, and
held that the enactment of child labor laws was a power reserved to
the individual states, and thus it did not fall under the federal govern-
ment's right to regulate interstate commerce. Similarly, in Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 1 7 1 the Child Labor Tax Law of 1919 was de-
164. See id. at 45.
165. See MASON, supra note 51, at 106.
166. Id.
167. See HAWES, supra note 78, at 45-46.
168. See id. at 46.
169. See id.
170. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (declaring the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional in so
much as it outlawed child labor).
171. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
2005] 1269
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
clared unconstitutional because a ten-percent income tax levied on
employers of child labor was in effect a penalty, not a tax, since the
purpose of the act was really to regulate child labor. It was not until
1938 and the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, that a federal
child labor law was effectively enacted. It, too, was challenged in the
U.S. Supreme Court, but this time the act survived constitutional
scrutiny. 172
Today, the general common law rule still gives parents the right to
their minor child's services and earnings in return for their parental
duty of support, 17 3 but such a right is subject to waiver by either fail-
ing to assert it or by direct agreement.' 7 4 Today, the remnants of this
legal theory may be found in the context of a parent-child loss of con-
sortium claim in a wrongful death suit so that parents may be permit-
ted to recover for the loss of their child's companionship, society and
affection. 17 5
This longstanding parental right has also been diminished by re-
cent reforms that are ostensibly in the best interest of the child. Some
states have passed special statutes that allow for partial emancipation
of minors employed as child entertainers, thus removing the child's
right to disaffirm the contract, and removing the parent's right in
many cases to control the proceeds of the contract. 176 Under these
statutes, and generally with close supervision by a court, a minor's age
disability is removed so that child actors, models, and athletes may
enter binding, nonvoidable contracts for artistic or creative services,
professional athletics, or endorsements of products or services. 177 For
example, the Florida Child Performer and Athlete Protection Act of
172. See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941).
173. See, e.g., McEntyre v. Jones, 263 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1953); Vaupel v. Bellach, 154
N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1967); Rohm v. Stroud, 194 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. 1972); Petition
of Parks, 127 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1954); Mitchell v. Mosher, 362 S.W.2d 532 (Mo.
1962).
174. See, e.g., Scheller v. Bowery Say. Bank, 217 A.D. 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (hold-
ing that mother's informal promise to keep her son's wages in trust to pay for his
college education was a waiver of her right to keep the wages).
175. See Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972); Reben v. Ely,
705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. App. 1985); Yordon v. Savage, 279 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1973).
176. New York, California and Florida all have similar statutes. See CAL. Crv. CODE
§§ 1556-1557 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ch. 743.08 (1997); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw
§ 3-101 (McKinney 2001); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 35.03 (McKinney 1984).
See also Stephen M. Carlisle & Richard C. Wolfe, Florida's New Child Performer
and Athlete Protection Act; Or What To Do When Your Client is a Child, Not Just
Acting Like One, 69 FLA. B.J. 93 (1995) (presenting the analysis that the real
beneficiaries of this type of statute appear to be the corporations who hire the
child entertainers, since they will be entitled to more effective remedies when a
minor breaches the contract, but yet the language of the act invokes the "best
interest of the child" as its purpose).
177. See supra note 176.
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1995,178 permits either party to petition a court to approve and over-
see these types of contractual agreements. The court will appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of the child if the
child's parents will benefit financially from the contract, for example
when the parent acts as the paid manager or coach of the child.179
While these statutes are not mandatory, they are certainly designed to
provide substantial protections to the corporations engaging the
child's services, and most corporations would be foolish not to proceed
under the statutes. 8 0
D. Parental Right to Make Medical Decisions for Minor
Children
The general common-law principle has dictated that children
under the age of majority are legally incapable of either consenting or
refusing consent to medical treatment.18 1 This principle was based
upon the premise that children "are incapable of intelligent decision,
as the result of which public policy demands legal protection of their
personal as well as their property rights."18 2 Thus, parental consent
is usually necessary before any medical treatment is administered to a
child.183 In making medical decisions on behalf of the child, the par-
ents need not consult with the child, and may even choose a course of
treatment to which the child objects in certain circumstances.18 4
The children's rights movement of the past thirty years has re-
sulted in an increasing body of statutory and case law that recognizes
178. FLA. STAT. ch. 743.08 (1997).
179. Id.
180. See statutes cited, supra note 176.
181. See Jessica A. Penkower, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents To
Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment-Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doc-
trine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1996).
182. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941). While acknowledging that
the question of a parental consent requirement had not yet arisen in most states,
this court found that a fifteen-year-old's consent to be a skin donor was not valid.
183. There are two general exceptions to the parental consent requirement. First, the
emergency exception applies if the child's parent or legal guardian cannot be lo-
cated and the child's condition requires immediate treatment. See Penkower,
supra note 180, at 1176 n.64 (citing as an example Luka v. Lowrie, 136 N.W. 1106
(Mich. 1912) (finding that under emergency circumstances, defendant physician
was justified in performing a foot amputation on an unconscious fifteen-year-old
whose parents or guardians were unascertainable)). The second exception ap-
plies to minors who have been emancipated, and thus have the capacity to con-
sent to their own medical treatment. States differ on the definition of an
emancipated minor, but generally an emancipated minor is "one whose parents
have completely surrendered care, custody, and control over the child."
Penkower, supra note 181, at 1176 n.64. Married minors are usually considered
emancipated. Id. at 1177.
184. See Cecilia Zalkind, Having the Final Say: Children and Medical Treatment, 175
N.J. LAw. 14 (Mar. 1996).
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that a child may, under certain circumstances, seek medical treat-
ment without parental consent.I8 5 The policy reasons underlying
these modern deviations from the traditional common law are two-
fold: first, the State assertion that it has a compelling interest strong
enough to usurp the parent's rights; and second, the recognition that
even a child has a fundamental right to privacy in obtaining certain
types of medical treatment, particularly abortion, pregnancy, contra-
ception, and treatment related to sexually transmitted diseases.' 8 6
Some modern legal commentators use a tripartite analysis of the com-
pelling or competing interests involved in medical decisionmaking: the
interest of the State, the interest of the child, and the interest of the
parent.' 8 7 Perhaps in that respective order of descension, the State
may exercise its power to intervene when it appears that the parents
are not acting in the best interest of the child, or when the State's
interest is more compelling than that of the parent.ss
Another modern trend, referred to as the "mature minor doctrine,"
enables a minor to bypass parental consent requirements. A mature
minor is one who either has reached a certain age, or level of maturity,
which renders the child capable of understanding the nature of the
treatment. 8 9 The doctrine has been codified in several states and
typically allows minors who are deemed "mature" to forego the paren-
185. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 335.
186. See Zalkind, supra note 184, at 17.
187. See Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Dis-
putes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 166 n.39. Sher advo-
cates that courts objectively balance these three interests by examining the
child's condition and its relationship to the state interest, the parent's interest
and objections, the proposed alternatives, and other influential facts underlying
the decision. Id. at 166-74. But Sher asserts that there has been "undue defer-
ence ... to parental decisions," and the "broad construction of parental rights at
the expense of the child's rights is neither desirable nor constitutionally man-
dated." Id. at 172.
188. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 335-37. The State may intervene in the best inter-
est of the child by alleging that the child is neglected by the parent's refusal to
provide necessary medical treatment. Courts will generally intervene if the lack
of treatment endangers the child's life, and the proposed treatment does not sub-
ject the child to substantial risk or suffering. See, e.g., People In re D.L.E., 645
P.2d 271, 272-76 (Colo. 1982) (ruling that parents who refused on religious
grounds to seek medical treatment for their epileptic child were guilty of violating
state statute); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tenn. App. 1983) (ordering
chemotherapy and radiation treatments for 12-year-old suffering from Ewing's
Sarcoma in spite of father's religious-based objections).
Examples of the State's more compelling interest may arise when public
schools require proof of immunization or medical examinations before a child may
attend school, or under state statutes that require treatment of infectious dis-
eases. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 335-37.
189. See Penkower, supra note 181, at 1166.
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tal consent and obtain certain types of medical treatment.190 In other
states, even in the absence of a specific statute, courts have applied
the mature minor doctrine.191 The major weakness of the mature mi-
nor doctrine is the failure of the courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, to provide any substantive definition of what consti-
tutes maturity. 192
1. Abortion, Contraception, and Birth Control Counseling
The most frequent, and certainly one of the most controversial, ap-
plications of the mature minor doctrine is seen in situations where
minors seek abortion services or access to contraceptives. 193 In a se-
ries of cases decided on the heels of Roe v. Wade, 19 4 the United States
Supreme Court has held that a state may not deny a minor access to
an abortion,195 nor access to contraceptives. 19 6 However, the issue of
parental consent for a minor's abortion has been a hotly debated topic
ever since Roe. The parental consent parameters, as articulated by
190. Id. at 1177-78. These also may be referred to as minor-treatment statutes, and
typically only apply to treatment for certain diseases or conditions, such as treat-
ment for alcohol and drug abuse, or psychiatric care. For example, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 394.56(1) (repealed 1998) which allows a minor who is at least twelve-
years-old to consent to outpatient mental health services but requires a hearing
to assure that the application is voluntary. See Penkower supra note 181, at 1178
n.78.
191. See e.g. Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992) (rec-
ognizing the existence of the mature minor exception to the parental consent
requirement).
192. Penkower, supra note 181, at 1182.
193. See id. at 1181-82.
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
195. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The United States Su-
preme Court held that a Missouri statute requiring parental consent before a
minor could obtain an abortion violated the minor's constitutional rights. While
acknowledging that the State has more authority to regulate the activities of chil-
dren than of adults, the Court could find no significant state interest in condition-
ing an abortion on the consent of a parent. The Court explicitly rejected the
interest of safeguarding "the family unit and of parental authority" by reasoning
that allowing a parent to overrule a decision already made by the minor patient
and physician will not "serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely
that such veto power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor
and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very exis-
tence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure." Id. at 75. But
see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (concluding that if a state statute re-
quires a pregnant minor to obtain parental consent, it must also provide an alter-
native procedure, i.e., some type of judicial bypass mechanism, for the purpose of
either demonstrating that the minor is mature enough to make such a decision,
or, alternatively, if she is not mature enough, that such a decision would be in her
best interests.).
196. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (extending the Griswold
holding to minors by prohibiting states from denying minors under sixteen years
of age access to contraceptives).
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the Court in Bellotti v. Baird,19 7 are the guidelines still in effect today.
Thus, a state may not establish a parental consent requirement that
effectively allows a parent the power to an "absolute and possibly arbi-
trary" veto of a minor's right to obtain an abortion.19s Since Bellotti,
the Court has upheld a Utah statute that required parental notice
rather than consent,19 9 and also a Minnesota parental notification
statute, but in both cases there was a judicial bypass component to the
statute.20 0
The 1990 Minnesota case, Hodgson v. Minnesota,201 illustrates the
aforementioned tripartite interest analysis, but here the Court ap-
plied the analysis a bit differently. Rather than looking at the interest
of the State, the parent and the child, Justice Stevens, in a plurality
opinion, considered the interest in the welfare of the minor (and the
State as protector of that interest), the interest of the parents, and the
interest of the family unit, and weighed each of those interests accord-
ingly.2o2 While upholding parental notification requirements in gen-
eral, the Court struck down the portion of the statute that required
notification of both of the minor's parents, because in many cases,
such a requirement would cause an undue burden on the minor and
furthered no legitimate state interest. 20 3 Justice Stevens emphasized
the longstanding parental interest in the upbringing of their children
and the Constitutional and judicial protection of this interest as it has
been articulated by the Court over the past century.20 4 While recog-
nizing that "the State has a strong and legitimate interest in the wel-
197. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
198. Id. at 644.
199. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
200. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
201. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 450.
204. The Court stated:
Parents have an interest in controlling the education and upbringing of
their children but that interest is a counterpart of the responsibilities
they have assumed. The fact of biological parentage generally offers a
person only an opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring.
But the demonstration of commitment to the child through the assump-
tion of personal, financial, or custodial responsibility may give the natu-
ral parent a stake in the relationship with the child rising to the level of
a liberty interest... [T]he family has a privacy interest in the upbring-
ing and education of children and the intimacies of the marriage rela-
tionship which is protected by the Constitution against undue state
interference .... The statist notion that governmental power should
supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse
and neglect children is repugnant to the American tradition. We have
long held that there exists a private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter. Thus, when the government intrudes on choices concern-
ing the arrangement of the household, this Court has carefully examined
the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation. A natural parent who has demon-
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fare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of
judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights
wisely" and "[tihat interest . . . justifies state-imposed requirements
that a minor obtain his or her parent's consent before undergoing an
operation, marrying, or entering military service."20 5
2. Treatment/ Testing for Sexually Transmitted Diseases
One medical condition in which a state has asserted a legitimate
interest in encroaching upon parental authority arises in the arena of
teenagers and sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs"), particularly
HIV. One commentator has opined that when states make HIV test-
ing confidential and freely accessible to youth, the HIV transmission
rate among that age group decreases. 2 06 Parents who oppose legisla-
tion designed to permit minors to obtain medical tests for sexually
transmitted diseases do so for a number of reasons, but the most often
heard assertion is that most teenagers are not psychologically pre-
pared to cope with the emotional trauma associated with the testing
strated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter enti-
tled to raise the children from undue state interference....
Id. at 445-47 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 444-45. Justice Kennedy (concurring in part and dissenting in part) would
have given even greater weight to the parental right:
The welfare of the child has always been the central concern of laws with
regard to minors. The law does not give to children many rights given to
adults, and provides, in general, that children can exercise the rights
they do have only through and with parental consent .... Protection of
the right of each parent to participate in the upbringing of her or his own
children is a further discrete interest that the State recognizes by the
statute. The common law historically has given recognition to the right
of parents, not merely to be notified of their children's actions, but to
speak and act on their behalf. Absent a showing of neglect or abuse, a
father possessed the paramount right to the custody and control of his
minor children, and to superintend their education and nurture. In this
century, the common law of most states has abandoned the idea that
parental rights are vested solely in father, with mothers being viewed
merely as agents of their husbands; it is now the case that each parent
has parental rights and parental responsibilities. Limitations have
emerged on the prerogatives of parents to act contrary to the best inter-
est of the child with respect to matter such as compulsory schooling and
child labor. As a general matter, however, it remains cardinal with us
that the custody care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder ... a State may seek to protect
and facilitate the parent-child bond on the assumption that parents will
act in their child's best interests.
Id. 483-85 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
206. Janine P. Felsman, Eliminating Parental Consent and Notification for Adolescent
HIV Testing: A Legitimate Statutory Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 5 J.L. &
POL'y 339, 345 (1996).
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and possible obtainment of positive results. 20 7 Furthermore, if in-
fected, adolescents may continue to engage in the same high-risk be-
haviors or fail to obtain treatment. 20 8 Thus, many parents assert that
parental guidance and support is necessary to reduce the emotional
stress, to ensure that adolescents obtain treatment, and to reduce or
eliminate the behaviors that caused the disease. 20 9
On the other hand, the compelling state interest argument is pred-
icated on the alarming rate that teenagers are contracting AIDS210
and the supposition that a parental consent requirement will reduce
the number of teenagers who choose to be tested for these diseases
because of the teenagers' fears of parental reprisals and their shame
in admitting to parents that they are engaging in high-risk behaviors.
3. Parental Consent for Commitment to Mental Health Facilities
As in medical care, a parent also has both a right and a duty to
provide psychiatric care for his or her child.211 Normally, a parent
may seek psychiatric care, including institutional care, without seek-
ing the permission of the State.2 12 In Parham v. J.R.,213 the United
States Supreme Court considered whether a parent may voluntarily
commit his or her child to a mental health facility against the wishes
of the child. Here, children undergoing treatment in a Georgia state
mental hospital brought a class action lawsuit against state mental
health officials challenging the constitutionality of the state statute
that permitted parents to voluntarily admit their children to state
mental health facilities. Claiming Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess violations, the children sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
Applying the tripartite analysis, the Court examined the child's inter-
est in not being committed, the parents' interest, and obligation, for
the health and welfare of the child, and the State's interest in provid-
ing mental health treatment to its minor citizens. 2 14 Dealing exten-
sively with the parental interest and yielding somewhat to parental
authority, the Court began its analysis with the presumption that par-
ents act in the best interests of their children.2 15 While permitting
"parents to retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the deci-
sion, absent a finding of neglect or abuse,"2 16 the Court concluded
207. See id. at 359.
208. See id. at 360.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 339. The teenage population is one of the fastest growing groups of
people contracting HLV in the United States. See id. at 340-41.
211. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 343.
212. Id.
213. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
214. See id. at 600-04.
215. See id. at 604.
216. Id.
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"that the child's rights and the nature of the commitment decision are
such that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable dis-
cretion to decide whether to have a child institutionalized."2 17 Thus
commitment decisions are also subject to a "physician's independent
examination and medical judgment."2 18
The Parham decision has been heavily criticized for failing to ade-
quately "protect the child's interests in a situation where those inter-
ests would often conflict with those of the parent and therefore would
not receive parental protection."219 Part of the criticism is no doubt
provoked by the Court's extensive discussion of the role of the parent
as decisionmaker for the child, and the strong deferential treatment
given to parental rights.220
4. Caveat: The Irony of the Current Law
The protection of parental rights, but only under certain circum-
stances, has been paramount in some states recently. Responding to
parental outcries erupting over the rising popularity among teenagers
in sporting tattoos over various parts of their bodies, many sympa-
thetic legislators have acted swiftly.2 2 1 For example, in 1996, the Ari-
zona Legislature passed a law making it a crime to tattoo anyone
under the age of eighteen unless a parent is present,22 2 in large part
because of the efforts of one Arizona mother whose fifteen-year-old
daughter came home with a "black swirly design" tattooed on her
stomach. 22 3 Not only are parents concerned with protecting their chil-
dren from the "frivolity of their youth," but they are also concerned
with the potential medical risks associated with the practice. 2 24 The
legal irony of the current state of affairs that deems a teenager mature
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See CLARK, supra note 84, at 344.
220. Justice Burger expounds on the historical concept of family in Western civiliza-
tion and the history of our jurisprudence in respect to the family unit:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents pos-
sess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judg-
ment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents
to act in the best interests of their children.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447; 2
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 190).
221. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-228 (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-92a
(2003); MICH. COMP. LAws. § 333.13102 (2001).
222. See Axiz. REV. STAT. § 13-3721 (2001).
223. See Andrea Petersen, Parents Spur Laws Against Tattoos for Kids, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 16, 1996, at B1.
224. Id. If tattooing is not performed in a sterile environment, the children are at risk
for contracting hepatitis, and possibly even HIV. Removal of tattoos requires la-
ser treatment, and may still leave permanent scarring. See id.
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enough to obtain an abortion without parental consent, but yet too
immature by law to obtain a tattoo, must be addressed.
E. Divorced Parents: Individual and Parental Rights Are
Subject to Forfeiture
Courts have found, in a variety of contexts, that individual parents
should be denied certain rights in cases of divorce. Recently, the ef-
fects of secondhand smoke on children have become a factor in child
custody decisionmaking. 2 25 Using the best interest of the child stan-
dard, some courts have considered a parent's smoking habits as rele-
vant in making a custody determination.226 The weight given such a
factor will vary depending on the individual facts in each case, but
more likely than not, the weight of such a factor will depend upon the
personal convictions of the judge. 22 7 Courts may place even more
weight on parental smoking habits when a child has existing health
problems that may be exacerbated by exposure to secondhand
smoke.228
Divorced parents may also lose their right to relocate to another
city. The effect of losing such a right is intensified when one considers
that "job opportunities, economic conditions, the needs of a new
spouse, and other factors may make it impossible for many parents to
remain indefinitely in the localities in which they had resided before
their divorces."22 9 While some courts recognize that a relocation bene-
fiting the parent may presumably also benefit the child, based on the
general theory that anything making the parent happier improves the
child's life, other courts reject such a presumption. 230 For example, in
Levine v. Bacon,23 1 a divorced father who was the primary custodial
parent, was denied permission by the court to move the child from
New Jersey to Florida, because such a move would adversely affect the
mother's visitation rights and therefore would not be in the child's
best interests. 23 2 In analyzing a state statute that required the
court's permission to remove a minor child of divorced parents from
225. See Michael S. Moorby, Smoking Parents, Their Children, and the Home: Do the
Courts Have the Authority To Clear the Air?, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827 (1995).
226. See id. at 834.
227. See id. at 835.
228. See e.g., Lizzio v. Lizzio, 618 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1994) (denying joint
custody to mother who smoked when one of the children was asthmatic); Mitchell
v. Mitchell, No. 01-A-019012CV00442, 1991 WL 63674 (Tenn. Ct. App., Apr. 26,
1991) (unpublished decision) (awarding custody of asthmatic child to the non-
smoking father over the mother who smoked, and conditioning visitation rights
on the mother providing a smoke-free environment for the child).
229. Arnold H. Rutkin, Away From Home: Children Caught in Middle by Parental
Moves, 78 A.B.A. J. 94 (1992).
230. See id.
231. 687 A.2d 1057 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
232. See id. at 1068.
1278 [Vol. 83:1240
THE JOURNEY TO FAMILY INTEGRITY
the jurisdiction, this court was bound by prior New Jersey precedent
establishing that "the custodial parent initially must show that there
is a real advantage to that parent in the move and that the move is not
inimical to the best interests of the children .... [Tihe moving party
must show that no detriment to the children will result from the
move."23 3 In spite of the fact that Mr. Levine was unable to procure
employment in his line of work in New Jersey, the court refused to
allow the child to be removed to Florida.234
IV. THE PENDULUM-OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM:
COMMENTARY ON SOME OF THE MORE
EXTREMIST POSITIONS
It should come as no surprise that as children have been granted
more and more rights there has been a strong movement to restore
parental decisionmaking and authority back to the parents. This
ever-growing expansion of children's rights has resulted in an equally
vocal parental rights movement. This section will highlight the polar-
ity of the children's rights/parental rights debates and how these de-
bates threaten the integrity of the American family.
A. Do We Really Need a Bill of Rights for Children?
Child advocates reflect two distinct schools of thought: the belief
that children must be liberated from their subservient status in Amer-
ican society by the recognition of a complete set of rights similar to the
rights of adults (child liberationists)2 35 and the belief that society's
laws must serve to protect children in schools, in families, and in the
233. Id. at 1066.
234. See id. at 1059, 1068.
235. One of the more radical and outspoken child liberationists is Richard Farson,
author of RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974). Farson proposes that children
be granted the following rights:
1. The Right to Self-Determination. Children should have the right to
decide the matters that affect them most directly . . . [diecisions
about eating, sleeping, playing, listening, reading, washing, and
dressing .... [ilncluding the right to choose their associates and
goals, and engage in adult activities.
2. The Right to Alternative Home Environments. Self-determining
children should be able to choose from among a variety of arrange-
ments: residences operated by children, child-exchange programs,
twenty-four-hour childcare centers, and various kinds of schools and
employment opportunities.
3. The Right to Responsive Design. Society must accommodate itself to
children's size and to their need for safe space ....
4. The Right to Information. A child must have the right to all infor-
mation ordinarily available to adults, including, and especially, in-
formation that makes adults uncomfortable.
5. The Right to Educate Oneself. Children should be free to design
their own education, choosing from among many options the kinds of
12792005]
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juvenile justice system (child protectionists).236 Child protectionists
are not opposed to the concept of rights for children but are more re-
luctant to grant full-scale autonomy to juveniles.237
Another more recent, but less extreme, position supports a Bill of
Rights for Children recognizing a legal right of children to
receive parental love and affection, discipline and guidance; the right to re-
ceive fair treatment from all in authority; the right to be heard and listened
to; and the right to be emancipated from the parent-child relationship when
that relationship has broken down and when the best interests would be
served.2
38
American child advocates, not content focusing their efforts solely
on the promotion of American children's rights, have taken their de-
bate to the international community. Many countries have found the
exhortations of American child advocates not only to be offensive, but
also threatening to the cultural foundations of their societies. This
was apparent in testimony given before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in 1996. Christine de Marcellus de Vollmer Herrera, Pres-
ident of the Latin American Alliance for the Family, highlighted sev-
eral areas of contention that Latin American countries find
particularly intrusive.23 9 According to Herrera, in preparation for the
United Nations International Conference on Population and Develop-
ment in Cairo, Egypt in 1994, the U.S. delegation fought against pa-
rental rights at every opportunity, opposing documents that
mentioned "marriage, family values, and morality on sexual unions of
all kinds, insisted on [clonfidentiality and [pirivacy for children, over
learning experiences they want, including the option not to attend
any kind of school ....
6. The Right to Freedom From Physical Punishment. Children should
live free of physical threat from those who are larger and more pow-
erful than they ....
7. The Right to Sexual Freedom. Children should have the right to
conduct their sexual lives with no more restriction than adults ....
8. The Right to Economic Power. Children should have the right to
work, to acquire and manage money, to receive equal pay for work
9. The Right to Political Power. Children should have the right to vote
and be included in the decision-making process.
10. The Right to Justice. Children must have the guarantee of a fair
trial with due process of law, an advocate to protect their rights
against the parents as well as the system, and a uniform standard of
detention.
Id.
236. See HAWEs, supra note 78, at 45-46.
237. See id. at 117-18.
238. Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q.
343 (1972).
239. U.S. Influence at United Nations World Conference: Hearings on United Nations
World Conferences Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 104th Cong. (June
4, 1996) (testimony of Christine de Marcellus de Vollmer Herrera, President,
Latin American Alliance for the Family), available at 1996 WL 463842.
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and above the rights and responsibilities of the parents."2 40 The U.S.
employed similar tactics at the Beijing conference. 24 1 Herrera, a Ven-
ezuelan, lambasted this American-led position as "the most dangerous
threat [her] country face [s] ... the overt offensive to destroy the tradi-
tional family and to export the new concept of family to the underde-
veloped world .... Delinquency and revolution thrive in the world of
illegitimacy and fatherlessness spawned by the sexual revolution."242
One commentator asserts that upon close examination of the lan-
guage, the treaty in effect transfers parental authority to the State, or
ultimately to the U.N.243 The United Nations' Declaration of the
Rights of the Child would recognize that children's rights are indepen-
dent of parental rights. 24 4 To say that the American position has ig-
nited controversy is an understatement. The American position
illustrates nothing more than our profound (and dangerous) cultural
bias regarding the rights of children in America.
Another extreme point of view expressed by some children's rights
supporters is the proposition that all parents be licensed by the State
before being granted the right to the custody and care of a child.245
One such advocate, Dr. Jack C. Westman, argues that all children
should be accorded a legally recognized right to competent parent-
ing.24 6 Westman bases his argument on four reasons: (1) all individu-
als, including children, should be free from abuse and oppression; (2)
all individuals should be granted equal access to opportunities to de-
velop their potentials in life; (3) to protect the common good of society
by regulating activities that are potentially harmful to others and to
society; and, (4) the welfare of the next generation is dependent upon
the "affectionate attachment bonds" that today's children form with
their parents. 24 7 Westman contends that licensing parents is neces-
sary to elevate the status of parenthood to a privilege and not a right,
240. Id.
241. See id.
242. Id.
243. Jacqueline Joyner Cissell, Domestic and Global Implications of Children's Rights,
NAT'L MINORITY POL., Dec. 31, 1995, vol. 7, n.12, at 7. Cissell points to the follow-
ing to support her assertion: Article 3 empowers the state-not the parents-to
determine and pursue the "best interest of the child." Article 14 guarantees chil-
dren "freedom of thought, conscience and religion" and authorizes parents to
merely "provide direction." Article 15 grants children "freedom of association"
with individuals and organizations of their choice." Article 16 grants children the
unlimited "right to privacy," the same terminology used by the U.S. Supreme
Court when it legalized unrestricted abortion.
244. See id.
245. See JACK C. WESTMAN, M.D., LICENSING PARENTS (1994). Westman credits psy-
chologist Harriet Rheingold as the original proponent of a parental certification
requirement in 1973. The idea was also expressed by philosopher Hugh La Fol-
lette in 1980. See id. at 218.
246. See id. at 217-19.
247. See id. at 245-46.
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thus demonstrating that parenthood is valued and supported by
society.248
B. The Other End of the Spectrum: The "Parental Rights
Movement"
Numerous parental rights groups, both nationally and locally,
have organized in response to the growing list of rights accorded to
children by the State, and the ever-increasing involvement by the
State in family relationships. 2 49 These groups, comprised mainly of
members of the Religious Right, have become the self-appointed advo-
cates of parental rights and family values in America. The sheer
strength of their numbers has enabled them to obtain the support of
many conservative politicians. Current efforts have centered on the
introduction of legislation and/or constitutional amendments in vari-
ous states aimed at codifying the U.S. Supreme Court rulings recog-
nizing the fundamental right of parents to control the upbringing of
their children.250 Additionally, Congress has introduced a bill known
as the "Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act" ("PRRA") which
would have the same impact at the federal level.251
Greg Erkin, in his capacity as executive director of Of the People, a
conservative organization directed at promoting parental rights,
maintains that parental authority is undermined when the govern-
248. See id. at 246.
249. These groups include Of the People, based in Arlington, Virginia, which classifies
itself as a nonprofit, nonpartisan parental-rights grassroots organization; Family
Research Council, based in Washington D.C., which calls itself a research and
educational organization (but based upon their Internet homepage, they are a
Christian-based organization); and Focus on the Family, a nonprofit organization
founded by Dr. James Dobson in Colorado Springs, which boasts a paid staff of
over 1300. Focus on the Family asserts in its Mission Statement that its "pri-
mary reason for existence is to cooperate with the Holy Spirit in disseminating
the Gospel of Jesus Christ to as many people as possible, and specifically, to ac-
complish that objective by helping to preserve traditional values and the institu-
tion of the family." Focus ON THE FAMILY, Focus ON THE FAMILY: WHO WE ARE
AND WHAT WE STAND FOR (Jan. 1997) (informational pamphlet).
250. A number of states have introduced either constitutional amendments (Alabama,
California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington) and/or other bills (Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin) addressing parental rights. See David Fisher, Note, Pa-
rental Rights and the Right to Intimate Association, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 418-19
nn.151 & 152 (1997).
251. H.R. 1946, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995), was introduced on June 28, 1995. S. 984,
105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995), was introduced on June 29, 1995. Both bills were
sent to committee during the 105th Congress. Because of the significance of
these bills to the thesis of this Article, the full text of the Senate version is in-
cluded in the Appendix.
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ment decides what is in the best interest of children. 2 52 He argues
that political leaders are sending parents a mixed message by calling
for more parental responsibility, while enacting laws that continue to
ignore parental rights. 2 53 Erkin argues that a parental rights amend-
ment will make "explicit in the law that parents aren't just an impor-
tant influence on children, but in fact are irreplaceable .... If parents
are irreplaceable, it follows that they must also have rights."254
While these parents' groups have a legitimate and meritorious con-
cern, the manner in which they address it subjects them to two major
criticisms. First, the proposed state constitutional amendments use
language drawn from two U.S. Supreme Court cases decided in the
1920s, Meyer v. Nebraska,2 55 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.256 Crit-
ics contend that the language is too broad and too vague and would
only create confusion and conflict. 25 7 Parental rights amendments
and similar legislation raises fears that the floodgates of litigation
would open, enabling parents to sue for any perceived interference of
their right to direct their children's education, medical care, discipline,
or religious instruction. The Colorado constitutional amendment
granting a parents the inalienable right "to direct and control the up-
bringing, education, values and discipline of their children" was put
before the voters in November, 1996.258 Early on, the majority of vot-
ers seemed to support the amendment, but once the opposition organ-
ized, the amendment was soundly defeated by a margin of sixteen
percent.2 59
Second, because of the fundamentalist Christian beliefs espoused
by these "pro-family" organizations, their political motivations became
immediately suspect to the rest of the country. 2 60 Based upon the na-
ture of some of their other causes, such as promoting anti-abortion
legislation and prayer in schools to name only a few, many believe
252. See MACK, supra note 4, at 303.
253. See id.
254. David Bauman, Conservative Groups Push "Parental Rights," TULSA WORLD, Feb.
9, 1996, at Al, available at 1996 WL 2007681.
255. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
256. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
257. Robert J. Samuelson, Sounds Great, Won't Work, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at 49.
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. Opposition to parental rights legislation and constitutional amendments was mo-
bilized by numerous groups including medical associations, churches, children's
advocacy groups, and women's rights groups, namely the American Academy of
Pediatrics, the American Association of School Administrators, the American
Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the
Child Welfare League of America, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, United Methodist Church, the National PTA, and the Na-
tional Education Association. See Barbara Dority, "Parental Rights" at the
Expense of Children, THE HUMANIST, Sept. 19, 1996, at 37, 38.
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that these organizations do not support the doctrine of separation of
church and state, but instead want to impose their religious beliefs on
the entire country.2 6 1
V. THE ULTIMATE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD ENURES
FROM THE PARENTS' REINFORCEMENT
As illustrated by the previous discussion, the polarization of the
family values debate has resulted in false choices on both ends of the
spectrum-one side has failed to acknowledge "the critical dimension
of family breakdown as a fundamental component of problems like
poverty and violence" and the other side has too often used its pro-
family stance as a "mean-spirited" attack on women's rights and
homosexuals. 262 Furthermore, many prominent legal scholars have
cautioned against the practice of "rights-mongering" as we attempt to
cure the defects of modern family law.26 3 These scholars insist that if
the law is ever to function properly in the interests of both parents
and children, our legal dialogue must move from centering on a battle
between individuals with competing interests to one depicting com-
monality of purpose.26 4 Family law statutes must be designed so that
courts will be obligated to "preserve and support the sacred and indis-
pensable ties that bind parents to each other and to their children." 265
The family institution has long been recognized as the foundation
of society upon which the future welfare of the human species de-
pends. 26 6 Western philosophers have expounded upon the concept of
family relationships based upon rights, duties, and responsibilities. 26 7
261. See id. at 37. Dority argues:
PRRA proponents aren't satisfied with forbidding just their own children
to read certain books in the school library; they demand that the books
be removed from the library completely, forbidding them to all the chil-
dren of the school. In other words contrary to what they say, these peo-
ple don't want to take responsibility for providing guidance and
establishing control of what their children see, hear and read. They
want the government to enforce their judgments for them-by law-
upon everyone's children.
Id.
262. WALLIS, supra note 1, at 128.
263. MACK, supra note 4, at 303-04. Mack identifies Milton Regan, Mary Ann Glen-
don, Walter Olson, and Joan G. Wexler as representations of some of these legal
scholars.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 304.
266. See Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545 (Minn. 1949).
267. See IMMAu.AL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT paras. 28, 29 (W. Hastie trans.)
(1790), wherein Kant discusses corresponding duties of parents and children, i.e.
parents have duty to preserve and rear their children. Children have right to be
preserved and reared by their parents until they are capable of maintaining
themselves (para 28) and parents have right to manage, train, and command the
child until the child reaches age of emancipation (para 29). See also JOHN LOCKE,
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Hegel reasoned that the family is "characterized by love" 268 and a per-
son's identity is formed based upon his or her status as a member of
the family, not as an independent person.2 69 The context of the indi-
vidual having rights need only occur when the family dissolves and
the individuals become self-subsistent, i.e., when the children come of
age and become recognized as persons in the eyes of the law. 2 70
Our society can reaffirm the critical value of families by recogniz-
ing that the family is an inviolable unit, and the primary role of our
legal system should be to uphold that inviolability. 271 Instead of pass-
ing legislation further delineating the rights of children as opposed to
the rights of parents, legislation must be directed toward the protec-
tion of the rights of families. Government programs and policies
should be aimed at strengthening and nurturing families, not just pro-
viding protections for children. Our family policies should be built
upon a system of principles embedded in deep fundamental truths
with universal applications that will encompass the diverse religious
values represented by this nation's populace.272
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. I, ch. II, at 5-13 (New York,
E.P. Dutton 1947). Locke stressed the unique emotional, physical and intellec-
tual needs of young children by asserting that the mind of achild was a tabula
rasa, a "white paper" and it is the role of parents to "govern their children" by
establishing early on the "authority of the father." Id.
268. G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 110 (T.M. Cox trans., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1967).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 110, 118.
271. Id. at 118.
272. This is imminently possible, as demonstrated by the work of at least one nonpar-
tisan group. The Council on Families in America, sponsored by the Institute for
American Values, functions as a thinktank of professionals from a broad cross-
section of disciplines. Its members include authors, scholars, a White House
aide, and family therapists. In 1992, the council issued its first report entitled
Eight Propositions on Family and Child Well-Being. These eight propositions
are:
1. In order to develop emotionally, socially and morally, a child re-
quires a strong, warm, lasting, and loving attachment with at least
one and preferably two or more adults who are deeply committed to
that child's well-being.
2. A basic social purpose of the family is to rear children to become
adults who are self-confident, socially responsible, and capable of at-
tachment and trust. The family, in short, carries the key social and
moral responsibility for raising the next generation.
3. Today the family is in a crisis that fundamentally threatens the
well-being of our nation's children. The marriage bond is steadily
weakening. Indeed, marriage is becoming de-institutionalized.
Children are spending less time with their parents, especially their
fathers. Across the society, children are less valued....
4. The current disintegration of the well-functioning, two-parent family
is a central cause of rising individual and social pathology.. .. The
evidence is strong and growing that the current generation of chil-
dren and youth is the first in our nation's history to be less well-off-
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Recognized by many as a children's rights advocate, Hillary
Rodham Clinton is probably more appropriately characterized as a
family rights advocate. Always speaking of children's rights in rela-
tion to the family, she has asserted that "unless we have a family pol-
icy in this country, then whatever we do on behalf of children in
relation to their families will continue to be band-aid medicine, lack-
ing clear objectives and subject to great abuse."2 73 She has acknowl-
edged the weakness of the best interest of the child doctrine as being
too discretionary, and often subjecting families to state control be-
cause of their ethnic or racial background, or because they are finan-
cially constrained.27 4 She has argued for a "family policy in this
country that provides stigma-free assistance to families in trouble
before their problems reach the extreme point of requiring wholesale
intervention."27 5 Is not this argument the same as stating that the
best interest of the parent will enure to the best interest of the child?
By improving the status and future for all families, aren't we improv-
ing the status of children?
psychologically, socially, economically, and morally-than their par-
ents were at the same age.
5. Family ties were relatively strong in the "traditional nuclear family,"
with its strict social roles of male breadwinner and female home-
maker.... Today, because of the importance of female equality and
the changing conditions of modern society, that previous model of
life-long, separate-sphere gender roles is no longer desirable or pos-
sible on a society-wide scale.
6. Yet the model of the two-parent family, based on a lasting, monoga-
mous marriage, remains both possible and desirable. Considering
all the alternatives, this family form is by far the most efficacious
one for children and for long-term individual and societal well-being.
7. The characteristics of an ideal social environment for child-rearing
consists of an enduring, two-biological-parent family that engages
regularly in activities together; has many of its own routines, tradi-
tions, and stories; and provides a great deal of contact between
adults and children. The children have frequent interaction with
relatives, with neighbors in a supportive neighborhood, and with
their parents' world of work, coupled with no pervasive worry that
their parents will break up.
Finally, each of these ingredients comes together in the develop-
ment of a rich family subculture that has lasting meaning and
strongly promulgates such family values as responsibility, honesty,
cooperation, and sharing....
8. A major cultural and policy imperative for our time is to increase the
proportion of children who grow up with their two married parents
and to decrease the proportion of children who do not.
See COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AM., INST. FOR AM. VALUES, WP21, EIGHT PROPOSI-
TIONS ON FAMILY AND CHILD WELL-BEING (1991).
273. Hillary Rodham, Children's Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds.,
Teachers College Press 1979).
274. Id. at 22-23.
275. Id. at 23.
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More recently, Senator Clinton has expressed the need to find com-
mon ground regarding family-policy debates. She asserts that pro-
gress is hindered when political debates only encompass two extreme
positions and, more often than not, the majority of people find that
they both agree, and disagree, with both sides of the argument, put-
ting themselves somewhere in the middle. 2 76 Arguing that the re-
sponsibility for families lies both in the private and public realm,
Senator Clinton buttresses her position with a quote from a pastoral
letter entitled "Putting Children and Families First," issued following
the 1991 United States Catholic Conference:
Government can either support or undermine families as they cope with the
moral, social and economic stresses of caring for children.... Some empha-
size the primary role of moral values and personal responsibility, the sacri-
fices to be made and the personal behaviors to be avoided, but they often
ignore or de-emphasize the broader forces which hurt families, e.g., the impact
of economics, discrimination, and anti-family policies.2 7 7
A. The Courts and the Right to Family Integrity2 78
An important and critical step in rebuilding the American family,
is the legal recognition of the family as a unit, with certain inviolable,
and fundamental rights. These rights may be found in the right of
family integrity previously intimated by the United States Supreme
Court.2 79 A legal right to family integrity will combine the rights of
parents and children, and it will ensure that a family will be free from
unjustified interference by the State. 28 0 Encompassing the reciprocal
rights of both parents and children, the right of family integrity is the
interest of the parent in the "companionship, care, custody, and man-
agement of his or her children, and of the children in not being dislo-
276. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN
TEACH Us 309 (1996).
277. Id. at 310.
278. Integrity derives from the Latin word integritas. The word refers to "soundness
or moral principle and character," and "fidelity and honesty"; it is synonymous
with "probity," "honesty," and "uprightness." BLAciKs LAW DICTIONARY 809 (6th
ed. 1990). Integrity also is used to describe wholeness, completeness and
soundness. In short, integrity encompasses all that is good, i.e., honesty,
incorruptibility, virtue, fairness, responsibility, and truthfulness.
279. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) ("The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Ninth Amendment.") (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923)).
280. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF FAMILIES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU
GUIDE TO THE RIGHTS OF FAMILY MEMBERS TODAY 87, 88 (Carbondale Southern
Illinois University Press 1996).
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cated from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of
daily association with the parent."28 1
B. The Rebuttable Presumption: Parents Are Acting in the
Best Interests of Their Children
To preserve the American tradition of family autonomy and to pre-
serve the right to family integrity, there could be national legislation
that guarantees the fundamental right to family integrity. This legis-
lation will recognize that strong family relationships are integral to
the future of our society; it will ensure that parents have autonomy in
decisions regarding child-rearing since they are the best determiners
of their children's best interests; and, it will recognize that children's
rights cannot be addressed apart from their rights as family members.
Legal questions involving children should begin with the rebuttable
presumption that parents are acting in their children's best interest.
This presumption may only be overcome if the State presents clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, or a compelling state interest
that outweighs the parental/familial interest, before the State may in-
terfere in the parent-child relationship. Thus, the State may not in-
terfere in the private realm of family life, unless it is necessary to
enforce criminal laws, deter domestic violence, or protect children
from serious mental or physical abuse.
Furthermore, a federally recognized right of family integrity will
aid in eliminating the judicial confusion surrounding the various deci-
sions emanating from lower-level courts throughout the country.28 2
Opponents to the parental rights amendment assert that new legisla-
tion is unnecessary, and will result in a plethora of new litigation.28 3
281. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting Stanley, 405
U.S. at 651).
282. For example, the First Circuit has characterized the right to family integrity as
being "nebulous." Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting
Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988)). The Hawaii Supreme
Court rejected a claim by parents that a sex education television series shown to
their children in a public school violated their constitutional right to direct their
children's upbringing. See Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 478 P.2d 314, 319 (Haw. 1970).
The Michigan Supreme Court dismissed the notion of a fundamental parental
right when it held that a state teacher certification requirement did not infringe
on any fundamental parental right by making it more difficult for parents to
home school their children. See State v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1993).
The Third Circuit recharacterized the Supreme Court's parental rights analysis
as not "fundamental" rights but as "substantial" rights. See Halderman v. Pen-
nhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702, 708 (3d Cir. 1983).
283. See The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act: Hearing on S. 984 Before the
Subcomm. on the Judiciary of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
153 (1995) (statement of Margaret F. Brinig, Professor of Law). While ap-
plauding the goals that the Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act seeks to
achieve, Professor Brinig argues that proposed legislation is not the solution.
"The primary losers will be the taxpayers of this country, who will pay the costs of
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This argument is overcome by the obvious necessity of legally defining
the scope of family rights, and the need to send a message to states
and to parents that parents have not only the right but the obligation
to be intimately involved in their children's lives. My proposed Family
Integrity Bill that follows in Part VII will provide the rebuttable pre-
sumption that parents do act in their children's best interests, and
familial rights will not be infringed absent a compelling and overrid-
ing state interest.
VI. SOME SUGGESTIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THE
PARENTS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES ACT
Current efforts have centered on the introduction of legislation
and/or constitutional amendments in various states aimed at codify-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court rulings recognizing the fundamental right
of parents to control the upbringing of their children. 28 4 Additionally,
Congress has introduced a bill known as the "Parental Rights and Re-
sponsibilities Act" ("PRRA") which would have the same impact at the
federal level. 28 5
First, it has been recognized that parents have responsibilities to
their children; however, since the main purpose of the bill is to protect
the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their children, the title
of the bill should be limited to the "Parents Rights Act." The parental
rights recognize the responsibilities of parents within themselves.
Second, under Section 2(a)(7), 28 6 legislators need to be more pre-
cise in the standard that courts apply in terms of when the standard is
to be applied and the elements to be applied. Since the United States
Supreme Court has failed to establish uniform caselaw regarding
these considerations, legislators need to pick up the torch that was
dropped by the Supreme Court and provide clear statutory language
for states and courts to follow.
Third, Section 2(b)(2) should be stricken as a purpose to this bill.
The purpose established in subsection 2 is completely at odds with the
the increased litigation . . . ." Id. There are two fallacious components to this
argument. First, there already is a good deal of litigation in this area of the law.
Second, this same argument could be used to counter any new legislation, and
then where would we be?
284. See supra note 250.
285. H.R. 1946, 105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995), was introduced on June 28, 1995. S. 984,
105th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995), was introduced on June 29, 1995. Both bills were
sent to committee during the 105th Congress. Because of the significance of
these bills to the thesis of this Article, the full text of the Senate version is in-
cluded in the Appendix.
286. Section 2(a)(7) states: "the traditional 4-step process used by courts to evaluate
cases concerning the rights of parents described in paragraph (1) appropriately
balances the interests of parents, children, and government." Parental Rights
and Responsibilities Act, S. 984, 104th Cong. § 2(a)(7) (1995).
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purpose of protecting parental rights. Additionally, protecting chil-
dren from abuse and neglect is such a compelling government interest
that legislators passed chapter 67 of Title 42 to the United States
Code, entitled Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption
Reform. 28 7 Therefore, it is unnecessary to provide for that purpose
under this Act.
Fourth, Section 3 of the proposed bill provides definitions. Defini-
tions 2 and 3 provide that the terms "child" and "parent" have the
meaning provided by state law. However, this does not take into con-
sideration what the meanings of those terms are in situations where
states did not provide for that definition. Legislators need to address
this situation.
Fifth, Section 6 provides for who may raise a violation of this Act.
However, if the true purpose of the Act is to provide for family integ-
rity and parental rights, then legislators would agree that children as
well as parents should have the right to bring a claim for violations of
this Act, especially since the legislators are purporting to be acting in
the best interest of children and parents.
In order for an act to truly protect the fundamental right of a par-
ent to direct the upbringing of a child with limited interference from
federal, state, or local governments, the issues and suggestions afore-
mentioned need to be addressed and resolved.
VII. PROPOSED FAMILY INTEGRITY ACT
While Senate Bill 984, The Parental Rights and Responsibilities
Bill, purports to focus on parent rights and the best interest of the
family, many of its purposes are at odds with each other. For exam-
ple, the child abuse and neglect purpose established in the Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act negates the focus on parent rights.
However, the bill I am proposing seeks to preserve family integrity
from a family and parent rights protection perspective, while encom-
passing the best interests of the children concept. The two purposes of
these two bills are quite different. I am proposing the following act,
which is focused on parents' rights and family rights with limited
state interference. However, I recognize that this bill is still subject to
criticism and that while it addresses some of the concerns such as nar-
rowing the focus to parent rights and family integrity, there are other
concerns that may be brought to light. What this bill does do is offer
steps on the journey to family integrity.
287. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119 (2004).
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A. A Proposal for Reform: A Bill to Preserve the Right of
Family Integrity
To protect the fundamental rights of families to function au-
tonomously with limited state interference and to protect the
family's constitutional right to privacy and association.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the Family Integrity Act of 200.
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS-Congress finds that-
(1) the family is inherently the most valuable resource of the
United States;
(2) the family is the fundamental building block upon which
society is based;
(3) the family is the primary caregiver and source of social
learning for children and must be supported and
strengthened;
(4) family rights cannot be accurately characterized as the in-
dividual rights of any family member; thus courts must
treat the family as an autonomous entity, thereby implic-
itly recognizing the parental role in protecting the child
from state action;
(5) parents are the best determiners of the best interest of
their children, as no one has a more precious stake in the
child's well-being than the parents;
(6) governments should not interfere in the decisions and ac-
tions of parents without compelling justification;
(7) however, when a family is unable to ensure the satisfaction
of basic needs of its children and youth, it is the role of soci-
ety to assist such family; and
(8) it is the joint and several responsibility of the Federal Gov-
ernment, each State, and the political subdivisions of each
State to assist families in obtaining access, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, to-
(A) the best possible physical and mental health;
(B) adequate and safe physical shelter;
(C) a high level of educational opportunity;
(D) effective training, apprenticeships, opportunities for
community services, and productive employment and
participation in decisions affecting their lives; and,
(E) comprehensive community services that are efficient,
coordinated, readily available.
(b) PURPOSES-The purposes of this Act are-
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(1) to recognize that parents and children have a mutual inter-
est in the family relationship that has been previously rec-
ognized by federal and state statutes and caselaw. These
mutual rights shall be referred to as the right of family in-
tegrity, a fundamental right implicit in the Ninth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The right of family integrity shall encompass the rights of
parents to direct the upbringing and education of their chil-
dren, and the rights of children to be raised in a family with
limited interference from state, federal and local
governments.
(2) to protect the right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children;
(3) to recognize that parents have a corresponding duty and re-
sponsibility to ensure that their children's basic needs are
met to the best of the parents' abilities; such needs encom-
passing the physical, psychological, and emotional needs,
including feeding, clothing, educating, disciplining their
children, as well as obtaining medical and dental care and
treatment as necessary;
(4) to preserve the common law tradition that allows parental
choices to prevail in health care decisions for a child unless,
by neglect or refusal, the parental decision will result in
danger to the life of the child or result in serious physical
injury to the child;
(5) to fix a standard of judicial review for the right to family
integrity, leaving to the courts the application of the right
in particular cases based on the facts of the cases and law
as applied to the facts;
(6) to establish a process to evaluate cases concerning the right
of family integrity as described above that-
(A) in a proceeding brought by the government against a
parent:
(i) requires that the government show that it has a
compelling interest in the protection and welfare of
the child that overrides the parental interest;
(ii) and that the governmental interest justifies the in-
terference or usurpation of the parental rights;
and
(iii) that the method of intervention or usurpation used
by the government is the least restrictive means of
accomplishing the compelling interest.
(B) prohibits a government from wrongfully interfering
with or usurping the rights of parents to direct the up-
bringing of their children absent a compelling govern-
mental interest.
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SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
(1) FAMILY-The term 'family' refers to a group of "individuals
who by birth, adoption, marriage, or declared commitment and
are mutually entitled to receive and obligated to provide sup-
port of various kinds to the fullest extent possible, especially in
times of need."28 8 The goal of society traditionally has been for
children to be raised in a traditional two-parent family, based
on a lasting, monogamous marriage, with both parents sharing
mutual decisionmaking responsibilities regarding the welfare
of their children, but when the goal is not obtainable, other
forms of familial relationships will be recognized, supported
and equally entitled to protection under this Act.
(2) PARENTS-The term 'parents' refers to the male and female
who are biologically responsible for having brought the child
into the world, but other individuals can be recognized as par-
ents, including adoptive parents, stepparents, or grandparents,
by a court.
SECTION 4. PROHIBITION ON INTERFERING WITH OR
USURPING THE RIGHT OF FAMILY INTEGRITY.
No Federal, State, or local government, or any official of such a
government acting under color of law, shall interfere with or usurp
the right of family integrity.
SECTION 5. STRICT SCRUTINY.
No exception to section 4 shall be permitted, unless the govern-
ment or official is able to demonstrate, by appropriate evidence,
that the interference or usurpation is essential to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly drawn or ap-
plied in a manner that is the least restrictive means of accomplish-
ing the compelling interest.
SECTION 6. CLAIM OR DEFENSE.
Any parent or child (by a legal representative) may raise a viola-
tion of this Act in an action in a Federal or State court, or before an
administrative tribunal, of appropriate jurisdictions as a claim or a
defense.
288. Ruth Macklin, Reproductive Technology is Changing the Family, in FAMILY IN
AMERICA: OPPOSING VIEwPoINTs 71, 78 (Viqi Wagner ed., 1992). Macklin advo-
cates that a broad definition of family is preferable and suggests using the quoted
working definition proposed by Carol Levine.
2005] 1293
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
SECTION 7. DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND DISPUTES
BETWEEN PARENTS.
This Act shall not apply to-
(1) domestic relations cases concerning the appointment of pa-
rental rights between parents in custody disputes; or
(2) any other dispute between parents.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that as children's rights have grown
in recent years, family integrity has eroded. In order to balance the
scales, and swing the pendulum back toward the center, the rights of
parents, in the context of a right to family integrity must be rein-
stated. A legally recognized right to family integrity is essential
before this country can effectively rebuild and strengthen families. By
codifying the rights and responsibilities of parents, and recognizing
the primacy of the parental role in guiding and nurturing the family,
the inviolability of the family unit will be firmly established in Ameri-
can law.
It is the role and duty of legislators and courts to ensure that the
best interest of the child standard does not overshadow the rights of
parents to decide the upbringing of their children. There is obligation
owed to families to protect children and parental rights equally. It is
possible to create a more structured standard than the current "best
interest of the child" that would encompass parents' reinforcement
enuring to the best interest of the child. What is good for the parent is
almost always good for the child. It can be a rebuttable presumption.
"[Wihat good mothers and fathers instinctively feel like doing for their babies is
usually best after all."
Benjamin McLane Spock2 8 9
"Often when a child leaves home to set the world on fire, she/he often returns
home for more matches."
Unknown
2 9 0
289. Benjamin McLane Spock, Parenting: Trust Yourself, available at httpj/www.dr
spock.com/article/0,1510,3947,00.html?r=related (last visited June 3, 2005).
290. A likely adaptation from: "Men who leave home to set world on fire often come
back for more matches." Confucious, quoted in Webster's Online Dictionary, Fa-
miliar Quotations: On Fire, available at http-//www.websters-dictionary-online.
org/definitions/english/on%5con fire.html (last visited June 3, 2005).
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APPENDIX: S.B. 984-THE PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES BILL
To protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbring-
ing of a child, and for other purposes.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the Parental Rights and Responsibilities
Act of 1995.
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS-Congress finds that-
(1) the Supreme Court has regarded the right of parents to direct
the upbringing of their children as a fundamental right im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty within the 14th amend-
ment to the Constitution, as specified in Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925);
(2) the role of parents in the raising and rearing of their children
is of inestimable value and deserving of both praise and pro-
tection by all levels of government;
(3) the tradition of western civilization recognizes that parents
have the responsibility to love, nurture, train, and protect
their children;
(4) some decisions of Federal and State courts have treated the
right of parents not as a fundamental right but as a
nonfundamental right, resulting in an improper standard of
judicial review being applied to government conduct that ad-
versely affects parental rights and prerogatives;
(5) parents face increasing intrusions into their legitimate deci-
sions and prerogatives by government agencies in situations
that do not involve traditional understandings of abuse or
neglect but simply are a conflict of parenting philosophies;
(6) governments should not interfere in the decisions and actions
of parents without compelling justification; and
(7) the traditional 4-step process used by courts to evaluate cases
concerning the right of parents described in paragraph (1) ap-
propriately balances the interests of parents, children, and
government.
(b) PURPOSES-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to protect the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children as a fundamental right;
(2) to protect children from abuse and neglect as the terms have
been traditionally defined and applied in State law, such pro-
tection being a compelling government interest;
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(3) while protecting the rights of parents, to acknowledge that
the rights involve responsibilities and specifically that par-
ents have the responsibility to see that their children are edu-
cated, for the purposes of literacy and self-sufficiency, as
specified by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972);
(4) to preserve the common law tradition that allows parental
choices to prevail in health care decision for a child unless, by
neglect or refusal, the parental decision will result in danger
to the life of the child or result in serious physical injury to
the child;
(5) to fix a standard of judicial review for parental rights, leaving
to the courts the application of the rights in particular cases
based on the facts of the cases and law as applied to the facts;
and
(6) to reestablish a 4-step process to evaluate cases concerning
the right of parents described in paragraph (1) that-
(A) requires a parent to initially demonstrate that-
(i) the action in question arises from the right of the par-
ent to direct the upbringing of a child; and
(ii) a government has interfered with or usurped the
right; and
(B) shifts the burdens of production and persuasion to the
government to demonstrate that-
(i) the interference or usurpation is essential to accom-
plish a compelling governmental interest; and
(ii) the method of intervention or usurpation used by the
government is the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing the compelling interest.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE-The term 'appropriate evidence'
means-
(A) for a case in which a government seeks a temporary or pre-
liminary action or order, except a case in which the govern-
ment seeks to terminate parental custody or visitation,
evidence that demonstrates probable cause;
(B) for a case in which a government seeks a final action or
order, or in which the government seeks to terminate pa-
rental custody or visitation, clear and convincing evidence.
(2) CHILD-The term 'child' has the meaning provided by State
law.
(3) PARENT-The term 'parent' has the meaning provided by
State law.
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(4) RIGHT OF A PARENT TO DIRECT THE UPBRINGING OF A
CHILD-
(A) IN GENERAL-The term right of a parent to direct the
upbringing of a 'child' includes, but is not limited to a right
of a parent regarding-
(i) directing or providing for the education of the child;
(ii) making a health care decision for the child, except as
provided in subparagraph (B);
(iii) disciplining the child, including reasonable corporal
discipline, except as provided in subparagraph (C);
and
(iv) directing or providing for the religious teaching of the
child.
(B) NO APPLICATION TO PARENTAL DECISIONS ON
HEALTH CARE-The term 'right of a parent to direct the
upbringing of a child' shall not include a right of a parent
to make a decision on health care for the child that, by neg-
lect or refusal, will result in danger to the life of the child
or in serious physical injury to the child.
(C) NO APPLICATION TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT-The
term 'right of a parent to direct the upbringing of a child'
shall not include a right of a parent to act or refrain from
acting in a manner that constitutes abuse or neglect of a
child, as the terms have traditionally been defined and ap-
plied in State law.
SECTION 4. PROHIBITION ON INTERFERING WITH OR
USURPING RIGHTS OF PARENTS.
No Federal, State, or local government, or any official of such a
government acting under color of law, shall interfere with or usurp
the right of a parent to direct the upbringing of the child of the
parent.
SECTION 5. STRICT SCRUTINY.
No exception to section 4 shall be permitted, unless the govern-
ment or official is able to demonstrate, by appropriate evidence,
that the interference or usurpation is essential to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly drawn or ap-
plied in a manner that is the least restrictive means of accomplish-
ing the compelling interest.
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SECTION 6. CLAIM OR DEFENSE.
Any parent may raise a violation of this Act in an action in a Fed-
eral or State court, or before an administrative tribunal, of appro-
priate jurisdiction as a claim or a defense.
SECTION 7. DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND DISPUTES
BETWEEN PARENTS.
This Act shall not apply to-
(1) domestic relations cases concerning the appointment of paren-
tal rights between parents in custody disputes; or
(2) any other dispute between parents.
SECTION 8. ATTORNEYS FEES.
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42
U.S.C. 1988 (b) and (c)) (concerning the award of attorney's and
expert fees) shall apply to cases brought or defended under this
Act. A person who uses this Act to defend against a suit by a gov-
ernment described in section 4 shall be construed to be the plaintiff
for the purposes of the application of such subsections.
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